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RATIONALIZING THE ABORTION DEBATE: LEGAL RHETORIC
AND THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY*
Roe v. Wade1 is a unique decision in the 180 year history of
judicial review. No other case, not even Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,2 caused such a loud and sustained public outcry. Even now, a
decade after the decision, the abortion controversy shows no signs
of abating. Political pressure remains strong for a constitutional
amendment to end legalized abortion.$ Nor has the debate been
confined to the political arena. There have been literally hundreds
of law review articles about Roe v. Wade and its progeny. In fact,
Roe v. Wade has been credited with touching off a renewed schol-
arly interest in the proper role of judicial review in a democracy.,
The United States Supreme Court's decision to protect a right no-
where stated or implied in the Constitution, invalidating laws ex-
isting in almost every state,6 has led to a reexamination of how the
* Assistant Professor, DePaul University College of Law. B.S., Northwestern University,
1975; J.D., Harvard University, 1978. I wish to thank Debra Evenson, Margit Livingston,
William Marshall, Jeffrey Shaman, Stephen Siegel, and Marcy Strauss for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this article. I also want to thank Joan Colen for her excellent
research assistance.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), was decided simultaneously
with Roe v. Wade.
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955). For a discussion of the controversy sur-
rounding Brown, see J. BAss, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981); R. GRAGLIA, DIsASTER BY DECREE
(1976); R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JusTicE 751-78 (1975); J. WILKINSON, FRoM BROWN TO BAKKE
(1979).
3. Resolutions proposing a constitutional amendment to ban abortions have been intro-
duced into each session of Congress since Roe v. Wade. See, e.g., S.J. Res. Nos. 17, 18, 19,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). There is strong pressure, especially by religious groups, for such
an amendment. F. JAF, B. LmHDEM & P. LEE, ABORTION POLITICS 90 (1981).
4. Between September 1973 and August 1976, over 140 articles were published in legal
periodicals on the abortion issue. L. WARDLE, THE ABORTION PRVACY DOCTRmNE: A COMPEN-
DIUM AND CRITIQUE Or FEDERAL COURT ABORTION CAsES xii, n.7 (1980).
5. Meeks, Symposium: Judicial Review v. Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2 (1981) ("I
believe the current interest in judicial review can be traced rather directly to Roe v.
Wade.").
6. "Roe invalidated every abortion statute then in effect in the United States, and, in
practical effect, legalized abortion on demand in this country." Moore, Moral Sentiments in
Judicial Opinions on Abortion, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 591, 633 (1975).
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Court should go about its task of interpreting the Constitution.'
Unfortunately, absent from all of this discussion is the simple
realization that the Court had to make a decision.8 Whether re-
strictive abortion laws were to be sustained or struck down, ines-
capably some conclusion based on the Constitution had to be
reached. Logically then, an analysis of Roe v. Wade, and its impli-
cations for modes of constitutional interpretation, must begin with
a consideration of the limited number of approaches potentially
available to the Court. Only by recognizing that the options for
dealing with the abortion issue are limited, and by considering the
assumptions and implications of each, can one come to any conclu-
sions about the wisdom or appropriateness of the decision in Roe v.
Wade. In section one of this Article, therefore, five possible ap-
proaches to the abortion issue are detailed and analyzed.
Understanding why the Court chose the approach that it did
requires the further realization that not every one of these alterna-
tives could have been adopted by the Supreme Court. The obliga-
tion to write an opinion justifying its conclusion as being princi-
pled, not arbitrary, and consistent with precedent, substantially
limited the Court in deciding this issue. Section two of this Article
examines the often overlooked constraint imposed on the Court
because of its need to publicly explain its decision and argues that
Roe v. Wade is understandable in light of this rhetorical
constraint.
The question in thinking about the ruling in Roe v. Wade,
therefore, is whether there was an alternate explanation for the de-
cision that would have been superior to that given by the Court.
7. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980);
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Meeks, supra note 5.
8. Some commentators have suggested that the Court could have avoided the question
of whether states may prohibit abortions by dismissing Roe v. Wade on justiciability
grounds. See, e.g., Epstein, Substantial Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion
Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 159, 160-67. But this approach only postpones the issue until a
justiciable case raising the abortion issue reaches the Court. The Court would then have to
decide the question. If no such case could ever exist (a possibility if the Court would dismiss
any case as moot if the plaintiff were no longer pregnant by the time the case reached the
Supreme Court), the Court would be making an implicit decision to defer to the legislative
process. See Bickel, The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 48-51 (1961) (defending the
Supreme Court's use of justiciability doctrines to avoid constitutional decisions); Gunther,
The Subtle Vices of the Passive Virtues, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1964). Such deference to
the legislative process, either directly on the merits or indirectly through justiciability, is
difficult to justify. See infra text accompanying notes 45-58 and 159-88.
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Section three attempts to provide and defend such an alternative:
regarding abortion as a private moral judgment. A key advantage
to this alternative is that it would provide a principled way to deal
with other aspects of the abortion controversy, as is explained in
the final section of this Article.
The abortion debate has become an area of impasse, not argu-
ment. There are two sides, labeling themselves as "pro-life" and
"pro-choice," each righteously fighting for their convictions. But
"most of the armament consists of the repetition of the original
intuition, suitably disguised as neutral argument."' Rationalizing
the abortion debate requires a comparative analysis of the options
and an examination of what approaches were realistically possible
for the Court to adopt.
I. ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ANALYZING THE OPTIONS
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, abor-
tion was illegal in forty-six states.10 Fourteen states" had laws sim-
ilar to the provisions of the Model Penal Code, allowing abortion if
necessary to protect a pregnant woman's life or health, if a fetus
would be born with a "grave physical or mental defect," or if preg-
nancy resulted from rape or incest.1 2 Thirty-two states prohibited
abortion except when necessary to save the woman's life.13 The po-
litical realities were such that it was highly unlikely that state leg-
islatures would repeal these laws. 4 This fact, together with the Su-
preme Court's earlier decisions invalidating state statutes
restricting the use of contraceptives, 15 made it inevitable that re-
9. Manier, Abortion and Public Policy in the U.S., in ABORTION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
POLICY STUDIES 27 n.6 (E. Manier, W. Liu & D. Solomon eds. 1977) (quoting A. Rorty).
10. Four states, Alaska, Hawaii, New York and Washington, repealed criminal penalties
for abortions performed in early pregnancy by a licensed physician. ALASKA STAT. §
11.15.060 (1970); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 453-516 (1970); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (McKinney
1970); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.02.060 to 9.02.080 (1970). The Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington
statutes contained residency requirements limiting access to abortion to residents of those
states.
11. A list of these fourteen state statutes is found in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 140 n.37.
12. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 139-40.
14. In part, the intensity and political power of supportersaof restrictive abortion laws
created "unusual legislative rigidity" and made reforms unlikely. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 929 (1978). In part, too, because abortion was available to the relatively
wealthy, there was much less pressure for repeal of restrictive laws. Id at 930.
15. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). While Roe v. Wade was
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form efforts would turn to the federal courts.1"
There were five possible approaches the Supreme Court could
have taken in deciding.the constitutionality of statutes prohibiting
abortion. First, the Court could have upheld the laws, holding that
under the Constitution, human life begins at or near conception,
and therefore fetuses are persons protected by the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments' guarantees of equal protection of the laws.
Alternatively, the Court could have refused substantive review of
the laws, concluding that the issue of abortions should be decided
by democratically accountable state legislatures. Third, the Court
could have declared the restrictive laws unconstitutional as a de-
nial of equal protection on the ground that they operate to dis-
criminate against indigent women who, unlike the more wealthy,
cannot afford to travel to areas where abortions are legal or pay for
safe illegal abortions. Fourth, the Court could have held that a wo-
man's right of privacy includes the right to determine whether to
terminate her pregnancy and that the state does not have a com-
pelling interest sufficient to justify interfering with this privacy
right until the fetus reaches viability. Finally, the Court could have
held that the absence of social or legal consensus as to when
human life begins requires that the legitimacy of abortion should
be regarded under the Constitution as a private moral judgment
which the government may not control.
pending before the Court during the 1971 Term (it was reargued and decided during the
1972 Term), the Court decided Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In declaring uncon-
stitutional a Massachusetts law making it a felony to distribute materials for prevention of
conception except by registered physicians or pharmacists to married persons, the Court
held: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free.from government intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a per-
son as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453 (emphasis in original); see
infra text accompanying notes 192-94. It has been suggested that this language in Eisen-
stadt was deliberately chosen by Justice Brennan to "help establish a constitutional basis
under the right to privacy for a woman's right to abortion." B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG,
THE BRETHREN 176 (1979).
16. Between 1970 and 1972 there were a large number of constitutional challenges to
restrictive abortion laws in federal and state courts. See, e.g., Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp.
224 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973); YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F.
Supp. 1048 (D. N.J. 1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp.
986 (D. Kan. 1972); Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970); United States v.
Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 402 U.S. 62 (1971); State v. Munson, 86 S.D.
663, 201 N.W.2d 123 (1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 950 (1973); Rogers v. Dan-
forth, 486 S.W.2d 258 (Mo. 1972) (en banc); People v. Belous, 71 Cal.2d 954, 458 P.2d 194,
80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
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Each of these approaches rests on assumptions which are diffi-
cult to justify, and each has implications which are hard to accept.
As John Hart Ely observed, "[a]bortion is too much like infanti-
cide on the one hand, and too much like conception on the other,
to leave one comfortable with any answer. ' 17 A search for an an-
swer must begin by analyzing the assumptions and implications of
each approach.
A. Approach 1: The Fetus is a Human Person
Had the Court chosen to uphold state laws prohibiting abor-
tion on the grounds that the fetus is a live human being and, as
such, a person protected by the Constitution,"8 it would have had
to premise its decision on a definition of "human life" and "per-
sons" that includes fetuses during early pregnancy. The most likely
definition is conception, recognizing the moment of fertilization as
the beginnings of human existence.19 This is the position of the
Catholic Church and the standard contained in many of the pro-
posed constitutional amendments which have been introduced in
Congress to overturn Roe v. Wade.21 Alternatively, the Court
under this approach could define life as beginning with the zygote's
implantation into the uterine wall which occurs six or seven days
after fertilization.22 Or the Court could conclude, as the West Ger-
17. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 927
(1973).
18. This approach is advocated in Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on
Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 807, 813, 839-52 (1973).
19. Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in History, in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION 57
(J. Noonan ed. 1970) ("at conception the new being receives the genetic code. It is this
genetic information which determines his characteristics, which is the biological carrier of
the possibility of human wisdom, which makes him a self-evolving being. A being with a
human genetic code, is a man."). But see ABORTION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR POLICY STUDIES
170 (E. Manier, W. Liu & D. Solomon eds. 1977).
20. See D. CALLAHAN, ABORTION: LAW, CHOICE AND MORALITY 409-47 (1970).
21. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 504, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982) (proposing to amend the
Constitution to establish legislative authority in Congress and the states to regulate abor-
tion); H.R.J. Res. 872, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (proposing that the Constitution be
amended to state "with respect to the right to life, the word 'person' as used in this article
and in the fifth and fourteenth Articles of Amendment... applies to all human beings
irrespective of age, health, function or condition of dependency, including their unborn off-
spring at every stage of their biological development.") See also, H.R.J. Res. 796, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S.J. Res. 119, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
22. Ramsey, Reference Points in Deciding About Abortion, in THE MORALITY OF ABOR-
TON 69-70 (J. Noonan ed. 1970).
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man Constitutional Court recently ruled, that human life begins on
the fourteenth day after conception when individualization oc-
curs.23 Any of these three definitions of when human life begins
could be used by the Court to hold that the fetus is a person dur-
ing almost the entire first trimester of pregnancy.
A Supreme Court decision declaring that life begins at concep-
tion would be based on the assumption that there is some basis for
concluding that under the Constitution, life starts at conception, or
shortly thereafter. There are many different points at which it can
be argued that human life begins.2 4 In addition to conception, im-
plantation, and individualization, alternate definitions of the initial
point of life include quickening-the first movement of the fetus
felt by the woman, viability-the point at which the fetus is able to
live outside the mother's womb, and even birth.25 A Supreme
Court holding that fetuses are human lives during the first weeks
of pregnancy must defend selecting one of the first three defini-
tions and not one of the latter group.2 6
If the Court decides that human life starts at or near concep-
tion, then all state laws allowing abortion, other than to save the
life of the mother, are unconstitutional. Once it is determined that
the fetus is a person, then laws which allow for its destruction deny
the fetus equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.27 If personhood begins at conception, then the state may not
discriminate against persons who are fetuses by offering them less
23. Kommers, Abortion and the Constitution: The Cases of the United States and
West Germany, in ABORTION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR POLICY STUDIES 94 (E. Manier, W. Liu, &
D. Solomon eds. 1977). The West German Constitutional Court determined that "[l]ife in
the sense of the historical existence of a human individual exists according to a definite
biological-physiological knowledge in any case from the 14th day after conception." On the
basis of this determination, the Court held that all abortions were unconstitutional. See
infra note 30 and text accompanying notes 27-30. The West Germany Court's decision is
reprinted in English in Gorby and Jonas, West Germany Abortion Decision: A Contrast to
Roe v. Wade, 9 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PROc. 551 (1976).
24. Englehardt, The Ontology of Abortion, 84 ETHICS 217, 228-32 (1974).
25. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 132, 160. The Court in Roe discusses each of these possi-
ble starting points for the beginning of human life at some length. Ultimately, however, the
Court concludes that there is no scientific, religious, or legal basis for choosing any one of
these definitions over the others. Id. at 159.
26. For a discussion of the problems with justifying such a definition see infra text
accompanying notes 156-62.
27. Louisell & Noonan, Constitutional Balance in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION 244-46
(J. Noonan ed. 1970).
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protection than other individuals in society.28 Thus, not only would
statutes which permitted abortion on demand be unconstitutional,
but even restrictive statutes based on the Model Penal Code (al-
lowing abortions in case of rape or-incest), would be impermissible.
If the fetus is a person, there is no basis for discriminating against
those conceived during rape or incest.2 9 Simply put, by defining life
as beginning at conception, the Court would be compelled to re-
quire that all abortions be prohibited, unless the mother's life is in
danger.30
Furthermore, once it is assumed that the fetus is a person,
then there is no legal basis for punishing abortion differently than
homicide.3 1 Traditionally, the penalties for criminal abortion in
states prohibiting abortion were significantly less than the maxi-
mum penalties for murder.32 But "[i]f the fetus is a person, may
the penalties be different?"3 " Does not such a difference deny the
fetus equal protection of the laws? Finally, if the Court defines life
28. L. TRmE, supra note 14, at 929. Some have challenged this contention arguing that
"[t]here is no reason to suppose that the performance of an abortion by a private physician
must constitute state action under the Constitution." Epstein, supra note 8, at 179. This
argument misses the point because the state laws which do not punish abortion as homicide
would be declared unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection to those persons who are
fetuses. It is well established that state laws permitting discrimination constitute state ac-
tion. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715 (1961).
29. Symposium, Law, Morality, and Abortion, 22 RutGERs L. REv. 415, 423 (1968). Cf.,
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Levy v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (discrimination on the basis of illegitimacy).
30. This is precisely what the West German Federal Constitutional Court held after
defining individualization as the beginning of human life. See supra note 23. West Ger-
many's law originally provided that a woman who destroyed her fetus, or permitted it to be
destroyed, would be punished by imprisonment. The Parliament repealed these criminal
sanctions against abortion and permitted abortion during the first twelve weeks of preg-
nancy by a licensed physician, but on February 25, 1975, the High Court invalidated the
Abortion Reform Act. The Court concluded that "abortion is an act of killing that the law is
obligated to condemn," and directed Parliament to reestablish abortion as a crime under the
Penal Code. 39 B. VERF. G. 1-95 (1975); reprinted in English in Gorby and Jonas, supra
note 23; see also Kommers, supra note 23. The dissenters on the West Germany Court did
not disagree with the majority's conclusion that abortion was unconstitutional. Rather, the
dissenters criticized the majority for ignoring principles of judicial review by substituting its
judgment for the legislature's. The dissenters maintained that the "question is a matter of
legislative responsibility." Gorby and Jonas, supra note 23, at 551. This, of course, is exactly
the basis for the dissent in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 171-78.
31. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 157 n.54.
32. See, e.g., N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:87-1 (1953) punishing abortions as a "high misde-
meanor" with a maximum penalty of seven years in prison.
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 157 n.54.
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as beginning at conception, then birth control methods such as the
intrauterine device and the "morning after pill" would also be
homicide since they act after fertilization and thus kill human
lives. 4
An additional implication of defining life as beginning at con-
ception is that the state could enact laws discriminating against
women because of its compelling interest in protecting life, and
thus fetuses at every stage of their development. For example, sci-
entific research has confirmed that alchohol and tobacco consump-
tion by a pregnant woman harms the fetus. 5 Because women
rarely know that they are pregnant until at least a month or two
after conception, only a total ban on alchohol and tobacco con-
sumption by women during their fertile years can insure protection
of fetuses. Though such laws would be discriminatory, there is no
doubt that states have a compelling interest in protecting the life
and health of persons within their jurisdiction. As Professor
Richard Epstein explains:
Let it be accepted that the unborn child is a person (or even is to be treated
like one), and it is clear beyond all question that abortion cases fall not
within the general rule that protects the liberty of each person to do as he
pleases but within the exception that governs the infliction of harm to
others.
3 7
In fact, a state's failure to enact measures of this sort to protect
fetuses might in itself be challenged as a denial of equal
protection."
34. Comment, The Morning Pill and other Pre-Implantation Birth Control Methods
and the Law, 46 OR. L. REV. 211 (1967).
35. Oullette, Rosett, Rosman & Weiner, Adverse Effects of Maternal Alcohol Abuse
During Pregnancy, 297 NEW ENG. J. MED. 528 (1977); Steissguth, Landesman-Dwyer, Mar-
tin & Smith, Teratogenic Effects of Alcohol in Humans and Laboratory Animals, 209 Sci.
353 (1980); Smoking Imperils the Unborn, 115 Sci. NEWS, Jan. 27, 1979 at 55.
36. Similarly, the state could bar women from working in environments that might en-
danger the health of the fetus. See Andrade, The Toxic Workplace: Title VII Protection for
the Potentially Pregnant Person, 4 HAnv. WOMEN's L.J. 71 (1981); Williams, Firing the
Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment
Opportunity under Title VII, 69 Geo. L.J. 641 (1981).
37. Epstein, supra note 8, at 171.
38. The argument that neglect by the state constitutes a denial of equal protection is
developed in Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreward: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Hmv. L. REV. 7 (1969); see also Wright, The
Role of the Supreme Court in Democratic Society-Judicial Activism or Restraint, 54 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1,15 (1968) ("[The Court must protect minorities] not simply from governmen-
tal persecution but from governmental neglect as well.")
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B. Approach 2: Deference to the Legislative Process
Many commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court
should have left the abortion issue entirely to the political process.
Under this approach, state legislatures would be allowed to pro-
scribe or regulate abortions as they see fit.39 Texas' statute prohib-
iting abortions except to save the life of the mother would be con-
stitutional,40 but so would New York's law, permitting abortion on
demand during early pregnancy.41 Advocates of this approach be-
lieve that it was inappropriate for the Court to create an additional
zone of individual autonomy.
42
If the Court were to adopt this approach it would need to jus-
tify why the abortion issue rests exclusively with the legislature,
without any substantive judicial review. The fact that popularly
elected state legislatures adopted laws prohibiting abortion does
not, by itself, make it inappropriate for the Court to review the
constitutionality of the statutes. The position that in a democracy
courts should always accept legislative choices, is intellectually de-
fensible,43 but contrary to two hundred years of American history.
Ever since John Marshall declared that "[it] is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is,''44 judicial review of legislative choices has been part of this
country's democracy. The Court could not uphold state authority
to regulate abortion on the ground that courts may never overturn
legislative choices.
Instead, deference to the legislature must be defended on the
assumption that a woman's right to an abortion is not protected by
the Constitution. This position in turn, assumes that the right to
an abortion can be distinguished from other rights which the Court
39. See, e.g., Henken, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1427 (1974).
40. TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1191-94, 1196 (Vernon 1925), represented in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. at 117-18 n.1.
41. N.Y. PENAL CODE § 125.05 (McKinney Supp. 1972-73).
42. Ely, supra note 17, at 943.
43. See, e.g., Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 340 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissent-
ing); McCloskey, Judicial Review in a Democracy: A Dissenting Opinion, 3 Hous. L. REv.
354, 360-61 (1966); cf., A. BiciKE, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SuPREmE COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962); L. HAND, THE BULL OF RGIMr 10-18 (1958); Choper, The
Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 810, 830-32 (1974); see supra note 8 for a discussion of the argument that the Court
should have dismissed Roe v. Wade on justiciability grounds.
44. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
115
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has protected.45 There are only two possible ways to distinguish
this alleged right from other rights. One would be to hold that in
cases protecting individual liberties the Court was safeguarding a
right enumerated in the text of the Constitution or clearly in-
tended by the framers.46 Abortion, by contrast, is nowhere men-
tioned in the text and certainly the drafters did not intend to pro-
tect a constitutional right to abort.47 Alternatively, the Court could
rule that while it may protect rights not mentioned in the Consti-
tution, it may only do so if the right is "fundamental. '48 Abortion,
the argument would go, is not such a fundamental right.4 9 Neither
of these assumptions is easily justified in light of numerous Su-
preme Court cases protecting similar rights, no more important,
nor more clearly stated or implied in the Constitution, such as the
right to contraceptives," the right to procreate, 51 the right to fam-
ily autonomy,52 and so on. Yet unless the Court could justify one of
these assumptions, the matter could not be left to the legislature.5 3
Furthermore, if the Court were to decide that the abortion is-
sue should be left to state legislatures on the basis of one of the
aforementioned assumptions, then one implication is that the
Court must also allow the states to regulate and even ban contra-
ceptives. The Constitution is just as silent about privacy and the
right to use contraceptives as it is about abortion. As Yale Profes-
sor Charles Black explains: "[N]othing in the Constitution said
. . . that the state might not make contraception a crime ....
[M]any believed that no provision or set of provisions written in
45. The impossibility of distinguishing the right of abortion is discussed infra in the
text accompanying notes 184-88.
46. This approach to judicial review, that the Court should follow the literal language
of the Constitution or the framers' intent, is often referred to as "interpretivism." See, J.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police
Power: the Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689, 709
(1976).
47. Ely, supra note 17, at 939. ("The Constitution has little to say about contract, less
about abortion, and those who would speculate about which the framers would have been
more likely to protect may not be pleased with the answer.").
48. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 24-27 (1962).
49. See generally A. BICKEL, THE MORLITY OF CONSENT 27-28 (1975).
50. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
51. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
52. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 159-88.
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the Constitution could by any far-reaching process of 'interpreta-
tion' be thought to refer to contraception."' 54 In fact, laws prohibit-
ing the sale of contraceptives and statutes forbidding abortion
were struck down based on the same non-interpretivist premise:
that the right of privacy includes "the decision whether to bear or
beget a child." 5  Consequently, if the Court takes the position that
it must defer to the legislatures on abortions because it is not a
right contained or implied in the Constitution's text, then it must
also overrule the decisions invalidating restrictions on contracep-
tives and defer to the legislatures on that subject as well.56
Finally, if the Court grants the legislatures authority to permit
or prohibit abortions, it must also allow the legislatures to enact
laws requiring abortions. It is conceivable that a state might some-
day choose to compel pregnant women to undergo amniocentesis
and abort defective children.57 If the Court may only protect rights
stated in the Constitution, leaving all else to the political process,
then it would be powerless to halt mandatory abortion.5 8
C. Approach 3: Equal Protection
It has long been recognized that'restrictive abortion laws oper-
ate to discriminate against indigent women.59 The relatively
wealthy can persuade a friendly doctor to perform the minor surgi-
54. Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REv. 3, 32-33
(1970); see also G. HUGHES, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT: LAW AND MORALS IN AMERICAN
LIFE 72 (1975).
55. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 453; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
56. Ely argues that Griswold can be justified because the framers intended to protect a
privacy that can be reasonably interpreted to include the marital bedroom. Ely, supra note
17, at 929 n.68. At most, this would allow the Court to strike down statutes forbidding the
use of contraceptives. States still could prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives;
regulations which the Court struck down in Eisenstadt and Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
57. Byrn, supra note 18, at 858 n.306; Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The
Need for a Life-Protective Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250, 1329 (1975) ("Therefore, it
does not seem unreasonable to predict that, under certain conditions, the state might very
well be in a position to demand that a woman be aborted as a 'lesser' sacrifice in order to
prevent her bringing 'deficient' children into the world.").
58. Such an implication, that states could even compel abortions, also would flow from
the proposed constitutional amendment which has been introduced into Congress to leave
abortion regulations entirely to state legislatures. See H.R. Res. 261, 94th Cong., 1st Seas.
(1975) ("Nothing in this Constitution shall bar any State or territory or the District of Co-
lumbia . . . from allowing, regulating, or prohibiting the practice of abortion.").
59. Worsnop, Abortion Law Reform in EDITORIAL RESEARCH REP. 543 (1970).
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cal procedure or can afford to travel to one of the states that allows
abortion on demand.60 Even when abortion was illegal in all states,
wealthier women still had access to abortion by travelling to for-
eign countries which allowed abortion.61 For example, between
1968, when Great Britain liberalized its abortion laws, and 1970,
when New York repealed its criminal ban, making legal abortions
available in the United States, it is estimated that 5,000 abortions
a year were performed on American women in Great Britain.
2
Poor women desiring an abortion and unable to afford the
costs of travel to say nothing of paying for the procedure itself,
face a cruel dilemma. On the one hand, they can carry the preg-
nancy to term and give birth to an unwanted child they cannot
afford. Alternatively, they can "subject themselves to the notorious
'back-street' abortion. . . fraught with the myriad possibilities of
mutilation, infection, sterility and death. '63 Prior to Roe v. Wade,
all too many women made the latter choice and faced exactly those
consequences. It is estimated that prior to 1973, one million illegal
abortions were performed each year in the United States. 4 Though
white women were as likely to have illegal abortions, the death rate
from illegal abortions was far higher among minority women. For
example, one study indicated that in New York City there were 0.8
abortion deaths for every 10,000 live births by white women.
Among black women there were 7.1 abortion deaths per 10,000
births and for Puerto Rican women the figures were 4.5 deaths for
every 10,000 births. 65 Altogether, it has been estimated that per-
haps as many as 8,000 women a year were killed in criminal abor-
tions,6" and these figures do not even speak of the injuries and ill-
60. Guttmacher, Law, Morality and Abortion, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 415, 421 (1967).
61. Worsnop, supra note 59, at 553. Since more than 60% of the world's population
lives in countries where abortion is legal during the first trimester, [Liu, Abortion and the
Social System, in ABORTION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR POLICY STUDIES 144 (E. Manier, W. Liu.
& D. Solomon eds. 1977)], it is inevitable that rich women will have access to safe abortions
while indigent women will not.
62. Worsnop, supra note 59, at 553.
63. YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1074 (D.N.J. 1972).
64. Worsnop, supra note 59, at 554; Guttmacher, supra note 60, at 420. But see Louisell
& Noonan, supra note 27, at 241-42 (disputing the one million figure).
65. Guttmacher, supra note 60, at 421.
66. Rossi, Public Views on Abortion in THE CASE FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION Now 27 (A.
Guttmacher ed. 1967). But see Tietze & Lewit, Abortion in Sc. AM., January 1969 at 54
(arguing that under 1,000 women die a year from illegal abortions). Even this lesser number
is, of course, still quite significant.
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nesses caused by illegal abortions, to say nothing of women
permanently sterilized.6 7 That these deaths and injuries are a re-
sult solely of illegality is indicated by the fact that there has been a
40% decrease in abortion-related deaths since Roe v. Wade. 8
Arguably the women who "suffer most from prohibitions on
abortion are likely to be the same women who have suffered most
from other sorts of discrimination or injustice: . . . poor women
and women who want to pursue careers outside the home." 69 Such
women can easily be characterized to constitute a "discrete and
insular minority" who cannot rely on the "operation of the politi-
cal processes" and deserve special protection from the courts.70
Prior to Roe v. Wade, well-funded, politically powerful groups op-
posing legalized abortion, possessing far more influence than the
disadvantaged poor women, insured that restrictive laws would
stay on the books.
Thus, the Court could find state laws forbidding abortion un-
constitutional as a denial of equal protection. A class lacking polit-
ical access, poor women, is disadvantaged and harmed, while
others, notably middle-class and wealthy women, can avoid the
burdens of the laws. 2 This approach to the abortion issue makes
two assumptions: that poverty can be a suspect classification and
that the state does not have a compelling interest in protecting the
fetus. Unfortunately, neither of these assumptions is easily
67. S. J. KLEEGMAN & S. A. KAUFMAN, INFERTILITY IN WOMEN 301 (1966).
68. Abortion Related Deaths Down 40% Since 1973 Supreme Court Rulings Overturn-
ing Restrictive State Abortion Laws, 5 FAM. PLAN. PERSP., Mar.-Apr. 1975, at 54.
69. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, in THE LAW AND POLITICS OF ABORTION 66 (C.
Schneider & M. Vinovskis eds. 1980).
70. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); see also
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1315
(1976):
[O]ne may ask whether democratic theory really requires deference to
majoritarian outcomes whose victims are prisoners, inmates of mental institu-
tions, and ghetto dwellers. Unlike the numerical minorities that the courts pro-
tected under the barrier of economic due process, these have no alternative ac-
cess to the levers of power in the system.
71. L. TRInE, supra note 14, at 929; Blake, The Abortion Decisions: Judicial Review
and Public Opinion: in ABORTION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR POLICY STUDIES 52 (E. Manier, W.
Liu & D. Solomon eds. 1977); Ely, supra note 17, at 935 n.89.
72. Guttmacher, supra note 60, at 420-21 ("illegal abortion is a horribly discriminatory
process .... [A] fat pocketbook will buy a safe abortion and... an empty pocketbook
means either one has to do it herself or one has to go to some para-medical person who is ill-
equipped to perform an abortion").
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defended.
The Burger Court has consistently rejected the argument that
laws which have the effect of discriminating against the poor
should be "strictly scrutinized."' "7 In Dandridge v. Williams 74 the
Court reviewed a Maryland welfare statute which set an upper
limit on the total amount of benefits any family could receive, re-
gardless of its size. The effect was that children born to families
over a certain size would receive no assistance. The Court held that
there was no basis for using any form of strict scrutiny, concluding
that the Maryland law constituted "economic and social welfare"
legislation which was sustained under a rational basis test.75 Like-
wise, the Court has upheld state laws which burden poor people by
restricting their access to the judicial process76 and by allowing for
their eviction from dwellings in summary proceedings.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
7 8
the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the contention that laws
which burden poor people must be justified by a compelling state
interest. In Rodriguez the plaintiffs challenged Texas' system of
financing public schools largely through the property tax, which
enabled wealthy school districts to tax at a low rate and spend a
great deal on education, whereas poor districts taxing at high rates
still had little revenue for schools. The Court held that allocation
73. Until recently equal protection analysis involved a two-tier test. Suspect classifica-
tions, such as race, and classifications burdening fundamental rights, such as travel, are
strictly scrutinized; that is, they must be justified by a compelling state purpose. See J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsTuToNAL LAW 524 (1978). By contrast, classifica-
tions which are employed in economic and general social welfare legislation will be upheld
so long as "they arguably relate to a legitimate function of government." Id. See generally
Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAnv. L. REv. 1 (1972). A third type of review referred to as
"intermediate scrutiny," reflecting something more than a rational basis test and something
less than strict scrutiny, has been used by the Court in some sex discrimination cases. See,
e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 1065-66. See also Perry,
Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and an Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1023,
1054 (1979).
74. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
75. Id. at 485.
76. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (sustaining a filing fee to file an appeal
from a decision terminating welfare benefits); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1971)
(sustaining a filing fee to file for bankruptcy). But see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971) (striking down a filing fee to file for a divorce).
77. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (upholding an Oregon statute permitting
landlords to bring an expedited action for possession).
78. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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of educational opportunities based on the wealth of the district in
which a child resided did not violate equal protection: there was no
basis for strict scrutiny merely because the law burdened poor peo-
ple in the allocation of benefits which could not be considered to
be a fundamental constitutional right.79 Thus, the Court has never
recognized poverty that constitutes a suspect classification. It
would, therefore, be difficult to justify striking down abortion laws
on the grounds that they discriminate against poor women.
Furthermore, even if the Court strictly scrutinized restrictive
abortion laws, it would have to sustain those laws if a compelling
state interest could be identified. 0 Protecting the fetus would be
such an interest, unless the Court were also to hold that the state
could not regard the fetus as a person. If the fetus may be consid-
ered a human life, then legislative protection is especially appro-
priate under the equal protection clause since fetuses are the ulti-
mate insular minority. As John Hart Ely observed: "I'm not sure
I'd know a discrete and insular minority if I saw one, but con-
fronted with a multiple choice question requiring me to designate
a) women or b) fetuses as one, I'd expect no credit for the former
answer.)
81
Simply put, determining that abortion laws operate to dis-
criminate against poor women cannot be dispositive in ascertaining
their constitutional validity. There also must be a determination
that the state does not have a legitimate interest in protecting fe-
tuses. Another difficulty with this third equal protection approach
therefore, is that it does not provide any basis for deciding whether
or not fetuses are persons which states may protect.
Moreover, does this approach mean that any criminal statute
which burdens the poor more than the rich denies equal protec-
tion?8 2 If the argument is that wealthy women can get safe illegal
abortions while poor women cannot, shouldn't the inequality be
eliminated by attempting to restrict the access of the wealthy?
States could enact stricter penalties against doctors who perform
illegal abortions or could criminalize leaving the state to obtain an
79. Id. at 28.
80. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (sustaining a law despite
use of strict scrutiny because of the existence of a "compelling interest").
81. Ely, supra note 17, at 935.
82. As Ely puts it, it is a strange argument for the unconstitutionality of a law that
those who endure it suffer. Id. at 923 n.26.
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abortion. In other words, achieving equality does not necessitate
legalizing abortion; the state could try to make it equally difficult
for rich and poor to get illegal abortions. If there is not substantive
objection to abortion laws, the equal protection approach will not
necessarily lead to legalization.
8 3
D. Approach 4: Privacy-Roe v. Wade
The approach chosen by the Court in Roe v. Wade held that a
woman's right of privacy includes the right to terminate a preg-
nancy. This fundamental right may not be infringed by the govern-
ment absent a compelling state interest. The state does not have
such an interest until the fetus reaches viability.
Justice Blackmun, writing for a 7-2 majority, authored the
opinion in Roe v. Wade. He began by acknowledging "the sensitive
and emotional nature of the abortion controversy" and the Court's
obligation "to resolve the issue by constitutional measurements
free of emotion and of prediliction. ' 8 4 After holding that the case
was justiciable," Justice Blackmun engaged in a detailed review of
the history of abortion laws, concluding that: "The restrictive
criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority of States today...
are not of ancient or even of common-law origin. Instead, they de-
rive from statutory changes effected, for the most part, in the lat-
ter half of the 19th century. '86 The primary purpose of the abor-
tion laws was not to save potential lives, but to protect the
pregnant woman's health, 7  an interest that "has largely
disappeared."88
Justice Blackmun then examined restrictive abortion laws in
light of the constitutionally protected right of privacy. Although
the right of privacy was first explicitly recognized in Griswold v.
83. The Equal Protection approach, however, can suppplement other approaches by
indicating a major undesirable feature of restrictive statutes: discrimination against poor
women.
84. 410 U.S. at 116.
85. Id. at 120-29; see generally. supra note 8.
86. 410 U.S. at 129. Justice Blackmun noted that at common law "abortion performed
before 'quickening' - the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing usu-
ally from the sixteenth to the eighteenth week of pregnancy - was not an indictable of-
fense" and that it is "doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a common law
crime even with respect to the destruction of a quick fetus." Id. at 135-36.
87. Id. at 151.
88. Id. at 149.
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Connecticut,9 where the Court declared unconstitutional a state
statute forbidding use of contraceptives, the Court noted that a
number of earlier cases protected personal autonomy in family
matters.90 The physical and psychological burdens of pregnancy
are so great that the Court concluded that the "right of privacy,
whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal liberty ... or. . . in the Ninth Amendment's reservation
of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. '91
While recognizing that the "right of personal privacy . . is
not unqualified and must be considered against important state in-
terests in regulation,' ' 2 the Court held that the state lacked a suffi-
cient interest to justify banning abortions until the fetus reaches
viability." During the first trimester of pregnancy the abortion de-
cision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of
the pregnant woman's attending physician. 4 The state may not
proscribe or regulate abortions during this period. 5 After the first
trimester and until the fetus reaches viability, the state may adopt
regulations to protect the pregnant woman's health, but it may not
prohibit abortion.9 6
The Court concluded that the state only has a compelling in-
terest in prohibiting abortion after the fetus reaches viability:
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life,
the "compelling" point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then pre-
sumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb.
State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical
and biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life
after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period,
except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
0 7
Thus, the Court held that a woman's right to terminate her preg-
nancy is such that the state may not prohibit abortion until the
89. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
90. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
91. 410 U.S. at 153.
92. Id. at 154.
93. Id. at 163.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 164.
96. Id. at 163.
97. Id. at 163-64.
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fetus reaches viability.
This approach is based on the unstated assumption that
human life does not begin until viability. Though the Court says
that it "need not resolve the difficult question of when life be-
gins,"98 it does just that by concluding that the state's interest in
the fetus does not become compelling until the fetus reaches via-
bility and is able to survive outside the womb. Holding that a wo-
man has a fundamental right to privacy does not decide the abor-
tion question because it "does not preclude the possibility that the
state's interest in preserving the fetus might override the woman's
claim." 9 If the fetus is regarded as a human life then the state has
a legitimate interest in its protection even if such protection would
infringe upon a woman's right to privacy.100 Society does not allow
parents to kill infants even though infants are a burden and an
infringement of privacy. Thus, only by assuming that the fetus is
not a human person until viability can the Court justify allowing
abortions prior to viability based on a privacy rationale. 101 Profes-
sor Richard Epstein notes: "The Justice simply cannot strike the
balance for the first trimester unless he has some theory of life of
his own which shows there is no 'compelling' interest of the unborn
child.
e1 0 2
The Court tries to avoid confronting its tacit choice that life
does not begin until viability by concluding that the fetus is not a
"person" within the Constitution, but that the state's interest in
potential life becomes compelling at the point of viability. 03 It at-
tempts to justify this conclusion by looking to the intent of the
constitutional provisions using the term "person.'' °4 But such an
analysis is, at the very least, disingenuous. Why should the intent
of the Constitution be controlling in deciding whether "persons"
includes fetuses, if intent is not controlling in deciding whether the
Constitution intended to protect a right to abortions? 0 5 The Court
98. Id. at 159.
99. L. TmB, supra note 14, at 927.
100. Many commentators have criticized the Court for simply assuming that the fetus
is not deserving of protection without explaining the basis for this premise. See, e.g., L.
TRIBE, supra note 14, at 927; Regan, supra note 69, at 75.
101. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 156-59.
102. Epstein, supra note 8, at 182.
103. Id. at 163.
104. Id. at 158.
105. Ely, supra note 17, at 926.
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then claims that state protection of the fetus after viability has
both logical and biological justification since the fetus is then capa-
ble of meaningful life outside the womb.
This is an implicit choice that personhood begins at that point
and not sooner. 10 6 As noted earlier, there are many competing stan-
dards for when human life starts: conception, implantation, indi-
vidualization, viability, or birth.10 7 The Court does not explain
why, of these standards, only viability, the capacity for life outside
the womb, provides a logically and biologically justifiable point at
which the state's interest becomes compelling.
An implication of the determination that the state's interest in
the fetus becomes compelling at viability is that medical progress
may virtually eliminate all abortions. Scientific advances might
make a fetus viable at an early stage of pregnancy. 0 8 If technology
is available to enable the fetus to survive outside the womb after
the first month or six weeks of pregnancy, then no abortions would
be allowed after that time. The result would be an almost total ban
on abortions.
One effect of the Court's decision that a woman's right of pri-
vacy allows her to have an abortion is that no one else, however
much interested in the pregnancy, may have a say in her deci-
sion.109 Privacy is a personal right. Statutes which allow others to
veto an abortion would infringe on the protected right. Thus, in
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, o0 the
Court, though conceding that the husband has a legitimate interest
in his wife's pregnancy and in the fetus, held that "since the State
cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during the first stage, when
the physician and his patient make that decision, the State cannot
delegate authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to
prevent abortion during that period." ' In fact, the Court has even
106. Id. at 924-25.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
108. S. SCHNEIDER & G. VINOVSHIs, THE LAW AND POLITICS OF ABORTION xxxviii (1980).
109. Viera, Roe and Doe: Substantive Due Process and the Right of Abortion, 25 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L. Q. 867, 875 (1974).
110. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
111. Id. at 69. Justice Stewart in a concurring opinion wrote that he found the issue of
whether husbands can veto abortions to be "a rather more difficult problem than the Court
acknowledges." Id. at 90. He, however, agreed with the Court: "Since it is the woman who
physically bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the
pregnancy... the balance weighs in her favor." Id.
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held that despite the constitutionally protected right of parents to
control the upbringing of their children,"' parents may not exer-
cise an absolute veto over their minor daughter's right to an
abortion.113
E. Approach 5: Abortion as a Private Moral Judgment
This approach is premised on the fact that there is no legal,114
social, 115 or religious18 consensus as to when life begins., While
everyone in society agrees that a two day old infant is a person,
such agreement simply does not exist as to a two week old fetus.
The Court could conclude that because it is equally defensible to
consider a fetus a human life or not, the question of abortion's le-
gitimacy should be left to each woman to decide on the basis of the
Constitutional right to privacy.118 Those women who believe that
life begins at conception would never seek abortions. Other women,
choosing different starting points for human life, would be able to
obtain safe, legal abortions. The entire matter would be viewed as
a moral question to be left to the individual.11 '
112. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Chemerinsky, Defining the "Best Inter-
ests": Constitutional Protections in Involuntary Adoptions, 18 J. FAm. L. 79, 95-101 (1979).
113. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). A detailed consideration of a mi-
nor's right to obtain an abortion without parental consent is beyond the scope of this article.
See Note, Parental Consent Requirements and the Privacy of Minors: The Contraceptive
Controversy, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1001 (1974).
114. See Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: the Legal and Logical Inconsistencies,
46 NoTRE DAME LAW. 349 (1971).
115. See Blake, supra note 71, at 23; Isaacson, The Battle Over Abortion, TMz, Apr. 6,
1981, at 20.
116. F. JAFFE, B. LINDHELM, & P. LEE, ABORTION PoLrrms: PRVATE MORAITv AND PUB-
LIC POLICY 87 (1981) ("Organized religious groups hold radically different theological beliefs
about the morality of abortion and the circumstances, if any, under which it is
permissible.").
117. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 160-61; Manier, Conclusion, in ABORTIONS: Naw DiREc-
TIONS FOR POLICY STUDIES 169 (E. Manier, W. Liu & D. Soloman eds. 1977).
118. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 159.
119. D. CALLAHAN, supra note 20, at 493, 497-98 (1970):
Whatever one may think of the morality of abortion, it cannot be established
that it poses a clear and present danger to the common good. Thus, society does
not have the right to decisively interpose itself between a woman and an abor-
tion she wants. It can only intervene where it can be shown that some of its own
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In part, the issue should be regarded as a private moral judg-
ment because it inevitably is one. Society can do nothing to stop a
woman determined to have an abortion from getting one. Instances
of self-induced abortions by the most primitive means are well
known and reflect the fact that so long as the fetus is in a woman's
body there is ultimately nothing society can do to stop her from
removing it. In this sense, laws restricting abortion are like those
prohibiting suicide. Both are totally unenforceable because they
prevent a person from inflicting harm to one's own body, some-
thing society can never stop absent constant monitoring of every
individual's conduct.
Not only is abortion inevitably a private moral judgment, soci-
ety should regard it as one. A ban on abortions is, in effect, a state
requirement that women carry pregnancies to term. The state is
compelling the woman to use her body as an incubator.1 0 It is
"difficult to imagine a clearer case of bodily intrusion. '121 Thus, in
the absence of any consensus as to when life begins, society should
not force women to endure the physical and psychological burdens
of pregnancy, or choose between an unwanted child or an unsafe
abortion. Instead, society should allow each woman to make the
choice as to whether to bear a child. 122 This would not represent a
social decision in favor of abortions, but rather a decision to leave
the matter to the pregnant woman.
1 23
Such an approach makes the assumption that the political
process may not choose a definition of when life begins if many
disagree with that definition. Undoubtedly society adopts many
laws which are unpopular. Does the absence of a social consensus
combined with the fact that such statutes impose burdens make
the laws unconstitutional? Consider, for example, laws requiring
conscription. Some believe that all conscription is immoral.1 24 Ulti-
mately laws requiring conscription, like laws prohibiting abortion,
are unenforceable because individuals who wish to avoid the laws
can leave the country. Conscription places a tremendous burden on
those drafted; it may even cost them their lives. While such argu-
120. See Regan, supra note 69, at 3.
121. L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 924.
122. Regan, supra note 69, at 23-25.
123. L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 933.
124. See Meiklejohn, Conscientious Objection in the Supreme Court: Welsh and Gil-
lette, 8 Cubt. L. REv. 1, 6 (1977).
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ments strongly support a volunteer army, they are hardly enough
to enable the Court to declare all conscription unconstitutional.
The point is that legislatures often make controversial moral judg-
ments that burden individuals. One implication of a Court decision
holding that abortion is a private moral judgment is, therefore,
that the Court must explain why abortion is constitutionally an
improper subject for a public moral judgment.
An additional implication of regarding abortions as a private
moral judgment is that a pregnant woman would be able to remove
the fetus from her body at any point during the pregnancy. Other-
wise, the state would be forcing the woman to endure the burdens
of pregnancy and be an incubator. The woman even could separate
the fetus from her body during the third trimester.
The state, however, could require that the removal of the fetus
be accomplished in the manner most likely to enable its survival.125
The state may also take whatever steps necessary to keep the fetus
alive once outside the woman's body and would care for a living
fetus, at that point usually called a baby, as it would any unwanted
infant. This approach is markedly different than that taken by the
Court in Roe v. Wade because the state may not prohibit removal
of a fetus at any stage of pregnancy, even after viability. The state,
under this approach, may only act to keep the fetus alive.
This approach, like each of the other four alternatives, is in
theory defensible, but difficult to justify and accept. Since none of
the possible approaches to the abortion issue is unassailable, the
inquiry must be whether the Court's choice in Roe v. Wade is any
more or less defensible than the other alternatives. Why from
among the various options did the Court select the approach that
it used? Ultimately, the answer to this question, the inability to
rhetorically justify most of the alternatives, demonstrates both the
125. For example, Minnesota enacted a statute providing: "To the extent consistent
with sound medical practice the abortion [must be] performed under the circumstances
which will reasonably assure the live birth and survival of the fetus." MINN. STAT. §§ 145-
412, subd. 3 (3) (1974). See Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F.Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974), appeal
dismissed, 420 U.S. 903 (1975). Such statutes are unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade to the
extent that they limit abortions during the first two trimesters of pregnancy. See, e.g., Col-
lauti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 85-86
(1976). In Roe, the Court determined that regulation of abortion during the second trimes.
ter could be justified only on the basis of the state's compelling interest in the health of the
mother. Therefore the abortion procedure could be regulated only in ways reasonably re-
lated to the health of the mother. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163.
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strength and weakness of the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade.
II. UNDERSTANDING ROE V. WADE: RHETORICAL CONSTRAINTS ON
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING
A. The Requirements for a Written Opinion as a Limit
on Judicial Decision-making
There is a popular fiction, prevalent especially among law stu-
dents, that the Supreme Court does whatever it wants in deciding
cases. While, of course, the Court theoretically can reach any con-
clusion it chooses,126 there is a powerful limit on judicial decision-
making: the requirement that the Court hand down a written opin-
ion articulating reasons for its decision.12 7 Although neither the
Constitution nor any statute compels the Court to write and pub-
lish opinions, publicly stated reasons for decision are embedded in
the American legal system.128 In fact, it long has been recognized
that the "traditional means of protecting the public from judicial
fiat ... [is] that judges give reasons for their results, and the con-
sequent disqualification of certain types of reasons as nothing more
than illegitimate statements of personal prejudice. 1 29 As the phi-
losopher John Dewey wrote over a half century ago:
courts not only reached decisions; they expound them, and the exposition
must state justifying reasons. . . . Exposition implies that a definitive solu-
tion is reached . . . . Its purpose is to set forth grounds for the decision
reached so that it will not appear as an arbitrary dictum, and so that it will
126. It must be emphasized that the Court's total freedom to decide the cases in any
way it wants exists only in theory. Many commentators have identified limits on judicial
decision-making. See, e.g., Braden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57
YALE L.J. 571, 574 (1948):
[T]here are only 4 absolute limitations on their power. First, a possible constitu-
tional issue must be brought before them .... A second absolute limitation is
the probability of obedience. A majority of the Court will not follow a course of
action which they believe will openly and literally be flaunted .... Thirdly,
they will not follow a course of action which they believe will lead to a successful
court-packing or similar plan aimed at them. Finally, they will not follow a
course of action which they believe will lead to their impeachment."
Id. (emphasis in original).
127. White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and
Social Change, 59 VA. L. Rnv. 279, 285 (1973).
128. See generally THE SPEECHES OF THE RIGr HONORABLE EDMUND BURKE ON THE
IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS 200-01 (H.G. Bohn ed. 1901). Cf., Raden, The Require-
ment of Written Opinions, 18 CALIF. L. Rv. 486 (1930) (the requirement in state constitu-
tions and common law for written opinions).
129. White, supra note 127, at 299.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
indicate a rule for dealing with similar cases in the future. It is highly proba-
ble that the need of justifying to others conclusions reached and decisions
made has been, the chief cause of the origin and development of logical opera-
tions in the precise sense; of abstraction, generalization, regard for consis-
tency of implications. It is quite conceivable that if no one ever had to ac-
count to others for his decisions, logical operations would never have
developed, but men would use exclusively methods of inarticulate intuition
and impression, feeling.
130
Thus, the rhetorical obligation to publicly explain a decision
constrains what the Court may do: even if all judicial decisions are
merely reflections of a judge's hunches or personal predilictions,5 1
the judge nonetheless must justify those rulings as based on legal
principles.132 Courts may only come to those conclusions which can
be justified in legally acceptable terms.
Specifically, the Supreme Court must write an opinion that
demonstrates that its choice is not arbitrary, but instead is based
on a legal principle and is consistent with precedents. 3 Each of
these requirements is an independent limitation on judicial deci-
sion-making. First, and above all, the Court, through its opinion,
must demonstrate that it has not made an arbitrary ruling. If there
are a number of possible ways to deal with a legal problem, the
Court must indicate that there is a rational reason for selecting one
approach over the others.1s
Second, the Court must be able to present its decision as being
justified by a legal principle.1 3 5 That is, the Court must articulate a
130. Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNEL L.Q. 17, 24 (1924). See also Karst,
Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 75, 75-76 ("unexplained
decisions tend to substitute judicial fiat not only for the rule of a democratic majority but
also for the rule of law").
131. Many have suggested that judicial decisions are merely public rationalizations for
hunches. See, e.g., W. DOUGLAS, Tim COURT YEARS 8 (1980); J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MOD-
ERN MIND 148 (1930); Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of Hunch in Ju-
dicial Decision, 14 CORNEI.L L.Q. 274 (1929).
132. R. WAssEasTRoM, THE JuDicLL DECISION 25-30 (1961); Bickel & Wellington, Legis-
lative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mill Case, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1, 3, 6
(1957).
133. Although this discussion deals only with Supreme Court adjudication in constitu-
tional litigation, these same limits obviously apply to all judicial decisionmaking, regardless
of the level of government or the issue.
134. R. WAssERsTROM, supra note 132, at 96.
135. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
19 (1959). While many critics have suggested that "neutral" principles do not exist, see, e.g.,
Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L.
REV. 661 (1960); Mueller & Schwartz, The Principle of Neutral Principles, 7 U.C.L.A. L.
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rule of general applicability that determines the outcome of the
case.136 In the areas of constitutional law, the Court has to an-
nounce a principle grounded in the Constitution which leads it to
decide the case in a particular way.
Finally, the Court must come to a decision which either is con-
sistent with precedent or which legitimately can be distinguished
from past decisions or which justifies overruling conflicting cases.
Our legal system is based on the "presumption that a controlling
precedent should determine the decision in a given case unless
there is a good reason for departing from it."1 7 The Court's deci-
sion-making is constrained by its need to either be consistent with
precedent or justify overruling it.1' Some might suggest that this
limitation is meaningless; that courts ignore precedents whenever
they want. However, even a cursory examination of Supreme Court
cases shows the tremendous power the doctrine of stare decisis
wields. For example, consider the Slaughterhouse Cases of over a
century ago. 39 Why has the Court never reversed that decision's
narrow interpretation of the "privileges or immunities" clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment,1 40 which virtually writes that provi-
sion out of the Constitution? 41 And why in so many instances does
the Court redefine a precedent in a totally inaccurate manner
rather than simply overrule it?14 2 Clearly, the answer is that the
REV. 571 (1960), all commentators certainly agree that the Court should articulate a princi-
ple for its decision.
136. Golding, Principled Decision-Making and the Supreme Court, 63 COLUM. L. REv.
35, 40-41 (1963); Wechsler, supra note 135, at 19.
137. P. BRST, PROCESSES OF CONsTrrunoNAO DacIsIoN-MMuNG 1119 (1975).
138. Braden, supra note 126, at 576.
139. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
140. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "no state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
141. L. TamE, supra note 14, at 423 ("The Slaughterhouse definition of national rights
renders the fourteenth amendment's privileges or immunities clause technically superflu-
ous"). As a result of the Slaughterhouse cases, the Court has not found a single right to be
protected by the privileges or immunities clause. See Kurland, The Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause: Its Hour Come Round at Last?, 1972 WASH. U. L. Q. 405, 414.
142. For example, consider Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In explaining the constitutional basis of the right of privacy, Jus-
tice Douglas states that Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), are First Amendment cases. However, clearly both decisions
were substantive due process cases based on the liberty of the due process clause and not
even remotely based on the First Amendment. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at
535; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 399. In fact, they could not have been First Amendment
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Court realizes that its legitimacy depends on creating at least the
appearance of consistency with precedents.
The importance of these limits on judicial decision-making
cannot be overstated. The primary difference between a court and
a legislature is not that only a legislature makes value choices.14
Courts, too, cannot escape the need to make difficult choices
among competing values.14' Rather, the central difference between
the judiciary and the legislature is that only the former must jus-
tify its decision with a written opinion.145 A legislature is allowed,
even expected, to make arbitrary choices, unsupported by a guid-
ing principle. No one has ever suggested that Congress be obliged
to follow stare decisis. A court, by contrast, must rhetorically jus-
tify every decision with a carefully constructed written
explanation.
Furthermore, even if in theory courts could ignore this re-
quirement for published opinions, 46 judges recognize that the le-
gitimacy of their decisions depends on the persuasiveness of the
justifications given for the rulings.147 Especially in a highly contro-
versial area, such as abortion, the Court's decision was limited to
that which could be justified as being principled, consistent, and
not arbitrary.
decisions since the First Amendment was not applied to the states until after Meyer and
Pierce were decided. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
143. Some commentators have suggested that in a democracy choices among conflicting
values must be made by the people through their elected representatives. See, e.g., J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 5, 103 (1980). But see Chemerin-
sky, Book Review, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 701, 702 (1981).
144. As Herbert Wechsler points out: "courts in constitutional determinations face is-
sues . . . that [inescapably] . . . involve a choice among competing values or desires, a
choice reflected in the legislative or executive action in question, which the court must ei-
ther condemn or condone." Wechsler, supra note 135, at 15.
145. Id. at 15-16.
146. At times, the Court has handed down a series of opinions without explicit ratio-
nales. For example, during the 1950's the Supreme Court decided a number of desegregation
cases with per curiam opinions. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (segregation
on buses in Montgomery, Alabama); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (segre-
gation on public golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (segrega-
tion in public bathing facilities). Similarly, during the 1960's the Court reversed over 30
obscenity convictions with per curiam opinions. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES
AND MATEI.ALS 1351-52 (10th ed. 1980).
147. P. BREST, supra note 137, at 3; M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME
COURT 26-31 (1964).
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B. Rhetorical Limits and the Abortion Issue
These limits on Supreme Court decision-making help explain
why Roe v. Wade was decided as it was. Many of the approaches to
the abortion issue which the Court in theory could have taken,
could not have been rhetorically justified.
For example, the first approach outlined above, the Court
holding that life begins at conception, could not have been legiti-
mized as a non-arbitrary choice. For the Court to declare that the
fetus is a person protected by the Constitution, the Court would
need to articulate a constitutional principle for concluding that
human life begins at or near the time of fertilization. Yet, it is
"equally reasonable either to assert or to deny that human life be-
gins at conception. '" 18 There is no scientific or technical,4 let
alone constitutional basis, for declaring that the fetus is a person
under the Constitution from the moment of conception. 5 ° The
Court could not rhetorically justify why life constitutionally begins
at that instant, and not at implantation, individualization, quick-
ening, viability, or birth. 51
Nor could the Court avoid defining when life begins if it was
to choose this first approach. Some commentators have suggested
that the Court could have just recognized that the fetus is a poten-
tial life and therefore justified constitutional protection beginning
at conception. 152 But what makes a fetus a "potential" rather than
an "actual" life? The answer must be that but for an abortion a
148. Manier, supra note 9, at 169. Compare, J. NOONA, THE MOPALrry OF ABORTION:
LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 57 (1970) ("at conception the new being receives the
genetic code .... A being with a human genetic code is a man.") with Heymann &
Barzeloy, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REv. 765, 776
(1973):
But much that we associate with the value of human life is not present at earli-
est stages. There is no feeling or thought of which we know. There is no recipro-
cal relation to others that is reflected in need or love. There is no memory or
fear. What most of us mean by life, what most of us care about when we think of
protecting life is not true of the 12 or 16 cells present on the third or fourth day
after pregnancy nor is present for sometime thereafter.
Id.
149. Manier, supra note 117, at 170 ("no amount of biological evidence can provide
adequate warrant for any claim concerning the starting point of individual human life").
150. Manier, supra note 9, at 5.
151. Englehardt, supra note 24, at 228-32.
152. Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a Life-Protective Amend-
ment, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 1250, 1253 n.16 (1975); Ely, supra note 17, at 925.
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human being will at some future time exist. However, but for the
use of contraceptives, a human being also would exist. In fact, but
for abstinence a human being would likely exist, too. The potenti-
ality of life is always present in human beings after puberty. Abor-
tion is condemned not because it stops a potential life from coming
into being, but because some believe that it is murder of an actual
human life.153 Yet, there would be no principled basis for the Court
to conclude that those who believe life begins at conception are
right and all others, with differing definitions of when life begins,
are wrong. Rhetorically, the Court had to reject the first approach
defining life as beginning at conception, and conclude as it did that
it "need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.'
1 54
Furthermore, even if the Court were able to justify holding
that the fetus is a person, the Court's rhetorical problems under
the first approach would not be over. The conclusion that life be-
gins at conception does not in itself justify banning abortion. The
Court would also need to conclude that the fetus' right to life was
constitutionally more significant than the woman's right to control
her body.155 It is difficult to imagine a greater invasion of individu-
als' control over their own bodies than compelling a woman to keep
a fetus in her womb against her will.'" It is not sufficient to simply
say the infringement of body autonomy is justified because a life is
at stake. Our legal system does not force people to donate their
kidneys, even if they could be used to save other human lives.1 7
The Court in dealing with the abortion issue would need to bal-
ance the woman's right to control her body with the fetus' right to
life. Once the Court has concluded that life begins at conception, it
is hard to imagine any principle the Court could articulate to re-
solve this value conflict.158 The problems with drafting an opinion
holding that life begins at conception are one reason why the Court
153. Bennett, Abortion and Judicial Review: Of Burdens and Benefits, Hard Cases
and Some Bad Law, 75 Nw. L. Ray. 978, 991 (1981) ("The life at stake, in the right-to-life
view, is not 'potential', but actual. The fetus is seen as equivalent in its humanness to in-
fants and children and adults since human life for them begins at conception.").
154. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 159.
155. Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, in THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF ABORTION 3 (M.
Cohen, T. Nagel & T. Scanlon eds. 1974).
156. L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 924.
157. Thomson, supra note 155, at 5.
158. In fact, "[i]s it possible to speak of principled judicial decision-making when more
than one value is at stake ... ?" Golding, supra note 136, at 48-49.
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could not pursue that approach.
Similarly, the second approach, holding that regulation of
abortion should be left to the legislature, could not be rhetorically
justified in light of other recently decided cases. In order to con-
clude that abortion is a matter properly left to the political pro-
cess, the Court would need to conclude either that it should only
protect rights stated or implied by the Constitution, or that while
it may protect some non-textual rights, abortion is not one of
them. Neither of these conclusions could be reconciled with
precedent.
Many constitutional commentators have argued that the Court
should confine itself "to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly
implicit in the written Constitution."'159 For example, Justice Black
contended that constitutional disputes should be decided by the
literal language of the Constitution.00 Raoul Berger repeatedly has
argued that a court in interpreting a constitutional provision
should be limited to what its drafters intended.1 61 Thus, the Court
would conclude that because reproductive autonomy is nowhere
mentioned in the Constitution it is not a proper subject for judicial
review. 6 2 Robert Bork summarizes this position:
Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify the value to be pre-
ferred there is no principled way to prefer any claimed human value to any
other. The judges must stick close to the text and history, and their fair im-
plications and not construct new rights .... Courts must accept any value
choice the legislature makes unless it clearly runs contrary to a choice made
in framing the Constitution.
163
While this position is theoretically defensible, rhetorically the
Court could not adopt it to justify refusing to rule on the abortion
issue because it is inconsistent with two hundred years of Supreme
Court decisions. The Supreme Court has never limited itself to
159. J. ELY, supra note 7, at 1. Ely terms this approach to judicial review
"interpretivism."
160. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377-78 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508-09, 520-21 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); H. BLACK, A
CONSTITUTIONAL FArs 33-34 (1969).
161. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Berger, Ely's "Theory of Judicial
Review," 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 87 (1981).
162. Ely, supra note 17, at 939.
163. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 42 IND. L.J. 1, 8,
10-11 (1971).
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protecting only those rights stated or implied in the text. 1 ' The
right of association,1 5 freedom of travel,"' and the right to vote 67
have been safeguarded despite the fact that they are not stated or
implied in the Constitution.'" Most notable with regard to the
abortion issue, the Court has protected many aspects of family au-
tonomy,16 9 including the right to marry,1 70 to form a family,171 to
procreate 72 and to control the upbringing of one's children,7  de-
spite the fact that none of these rights can be found in the text of
the Constitution. In fact, the Court has explicitly rejected the no-
tion that it is confined to "interpretivism." Chief Justice Hughes,
writing for the Court in Home Building and Loan v. Blaisdell,17 4
stated:
It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended a century
ago, or to insist that what the provision of the Constitution meant to the
vision of that day it must mean to the vision of our time. If by the statement
that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means to-day,
164. For an excellent discussion of the Court's consistent refusal to take an interpre.
tivist approach to constitutional questions, see Shaman, The Constitution, the Supreme
Court, and Creativity, 9 HASTNGS CONsT. L.Q. 257 (1982).
165. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
166. See, e.g., Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
167. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964); Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
168. The list could go on and on of non-textual rights protected by the Court. See J.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 70-79 (1980); Grey, Do We
Have an Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 716-17 (1975).
169. For a comprehensive review of the constitutional protection of family autonomy,
see Burt, The Constitution and the Family, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 329; Developments in the
Law - The Constitution and the Family, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1980).
170. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating a Wisconsin law that inter-
fered with the "right to marry").
171. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating on substantive
due process grounds a zoning ordinance that defined "family" so narrowly as to prevent a
grandmother from living with her two grandsons who were first cousins rather than
brothers).
172. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (declaring unconstitutional an
Oklahoma statute providing for the sterilization of persons convicted of two or more "felo-
nies involving moral turpitude"). The right to reproduce was held to be "one of the basic
civil rights of man." Id. at 541.
173. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (the right of parents to institutionalize their
children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (the right of parents to control
the upbringing of their children includes the right to send their children to private and
parochial schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating a Nebraska law
which prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to elementary school students).
174. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be con-
fined to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and out-
look of their time, would have placed upon them, the statement carries its
own refutation. It was to guard against such a narrow conception that Chief
Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning - "We must never forget




Simply put, rhetorically the Court could not leave the abortion is-
sue to the political process on the grounds that the Constitution is
silent on the subject. Such an approach would be inconsistent with
the language and effect of countless other decisions declaring
rights to be fundamental despite the absence of textual language or
framers' intent justifying such protection.
Furthermore, even if the Court wanted to depart from prece-
dents and hold that it should be guided by interpretivism, rhetori-
cally interpretivism is difficult to defend. John Hart Ely, himself a
critic of Roe v. Wade, 17 has argued that interpretivism is an allur-
ing impossibility.177 Ely's argument against interpretivism is a fa-
miliar one. 7 8 He contends that the model is doomed to failure be-
cause in most important areas the Constitution is intentionally
vague.1 79 Phrases such as "equal protection" and "due process" are
indeterminate and were "purposely left to gather meaning from ex-
perience."180 Nor can the "framers'" intent provide much guidance
to the Court in interpreting the Constitution, as it was their intent
that the Constitution be defined, and redefined, in the light of ex-
periences and exigencies of succeeding generations."181 In addition,
it is difficult to justify relying on the framers' intentions, even if
they could be identified. A "nation wholly different from that ex-
isting in 1787, facing problems obviously not within the contempla-
tion of the founding fathers, can scarcely be governed - except in
broadest generality, by the concepts of yesteryear. 18 2 It would
therefore be difficult, if not impossible, to justify the Court's deci-
175. Id. at 442-43 (emphasis in original).
176. Ely, supra note 17.
177. J. ELY, supra note 7, at 1-41; Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and
Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978).
178. See, e.g., Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. Rxv. 703
(1975); Miller & Howell, supra note 135.
179. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting); A. BicKL, supra note 48, at 103-10; J. ELY, supra note 7, at 11-41.
180. R. MCCLOsKEY, THE AMERIcAN SUPREME COURT 15 (1960).
181. J. ELY, supra note 7, at 17.
182. Miller & Howell, supra note 135, at 683.
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sion that the abortion issue should be left to the legislative process
because it is a non-textual right.183
The other possible basis for judicial deference to the political
process would be for the Court to conclude that while it may pro-
tect fundamental rights not enumerated in the Constitution, abor-
tion is not such a right.18 4 The Court would need to hold that a
woman does not have a fundamental interest in deciding whether
to carry a fetus in her body. This conclusion however, would be
hard to justify in light of other recent Supreme Court decisions.
For example, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,18 5 the Supreme Court de-
clared: "if the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
ment intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child."188 This language,
handed down just a year before the decision in Roe v. Wade, would
make it rhetorically difficult for the Court to hold that the right to
decide whether to bear a fetus is not fundamental.1 87 Furthermore,
since the right of access to contraceptives es has been deemed a
fundamental right, could the Court possibly justify holding that
the right to an abortion is not "fundamental?"
The third approach, that restrictive abortion laws deny equal
protection to poor women, is the clearest example of an alternative
that was not rhetorically possible. If the Court had followed this
approach it would have concluded that because rich women were
able to get safe abortions, while poor women could not, laws for-
bidding abortion denied equal protection.189 As noted above, such
a conclusion is inconsistent with recent Supreme Court cases ex-
plicitly holding that poverty is not a suspect classification.1 90 That
is, a denial of equal protection could not be proven simply because
183. It should be noted that this is the most frequent criticism of Roe v. Wade: that the
Court should not have protected a right to abortion because the Constitution is silent on the
matter. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 17, at 943.
184. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 8, at 180.
185. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
186. Id. at 453.
187. There is speculation that Justice Brennan in writing for the majority in Eisenstadt
used this language precisely to limit, or at least guide, the Court in deciding the abortion
issue. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 15, at 175-76.
188. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 59-72.
190. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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the effect of the law was to disadvantage poor people.191 Moreover,
even if the Court had found that state statutes banning abortion
violated the equal protection clause, the Court would then have
had to justify concluding that the state did not have a compelling
interest in protecting fetal life.
It is, of course, never possible to know why the Court decides
as it does. The purpose of the above analysis is not to suggest a
definitive explanation for why these alternatives were rejected.
Rather, the point simply is that alternatives which were possible in
theory could not have been justified rhetorically as principled, not
arbitrary, and consistent with precedents.
C. The Rhetoric of Roe v. Wade
The Court's choice of approach in Roe v. Wade is understand-
able because it avoids many of the rhetorical problems inherent in
the other alternatives. First, the Court was able to articulate a le-
gal principle to justify its decision: that the "right of privacy,
whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal liberty and restrictives upon state action, . . . or. . . in
the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy. ' 19 2 The right to privacy had already been
found to be fundamental under the Constitution.9 3 Thus the
Court only needed to explain why a woman's choice of whether to
have an abortion fits within her constitutionally protected right to
privacy. The burden of an unwanted pregnancy is so great that the
Court had little difficulty in demonstrating that the right to pri-
vacy includes the right to decide whether or not to have an abor-
tion." Justice Blackmun observed:
191. Furthermore, in subsequent cases the Court has held that a discriminatory effect
of a law is not sufficient to prove a violation of equal protection. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55 (1980); Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Thus, under current standards, to demonstrate that restrictive
abortion laws violate equal protection it would be necessary to prove that they were moti-
vated by a discriminatory purpose. There is, however, no indication that abortion was
banned to discriminate against poor women.
192. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153-54.
193. See, e.g. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 351 U.S. 479 (1965).
194. See L. TRIE, supra note 14, at 924; Regan, supra note 69, at 23.
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The detriment that the state would impose upon the pregnant woman by
denying her this choice is altogether apparent. Specific and direct harm medi-
cally diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or ad-
ditional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future.
Psychological harm might be imminent. Mental and physical health may be
taxed by child care. 195
If the right to privacy means anything, it surely includes the privi-
lege of deciding whether one's body will be used to bring another
life into the world.19 6
Second, the Court could avoid the appearance of making an
arbitrary choice as to when life begins. In fact, the Court con-
tended that its approach entirely avoided resolving the question of
when life begins. 197 The Court concluded that "[W]hen those
trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at
this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a posi-
tion to speculate as to the answer."198 Rhetorically, this is a far
easier conclusion to justify than would be any attempt to identify a
point when life begins.
Finally, the Court's approach in Roe v. Wade could be
presented as consistent with precedent. Most obviously, it follows
directly from the Court's declaration in Eisenstadt that the Con-
stitution protects the "decision whether to bear or beget a
child." 9 Less obviously, the Court's decision was consistent with
traditional tort and criminal law principles which do not recognize
the fetus as a person. The Court noted its consistency with these
legal doctrines: "In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has
been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it,
begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the unborn ex-
cept in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are
contingent upon live birth." 00
While the Court's approach is easier to justify than most of
the alternatives, it has two major rhetorical problems. First, even if
a woman has a right to privacy, why does this right outweigh a
state's interest in protecting what it regards as human life? The
195. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
196. See L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 923.
197. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 159.
198. Id.
199. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 453.
200. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 161.
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conclusion that the right to privacy includes the right to terminate
a pregnancy does not mean that the state does not have a compel-
ling interest in protecting the life of the fetus.20 1 The Court to
complete its analysis had to justify why the woman's privacy inter-
est deserved constitutional priority over the fetus' right to life. The
Court needed to articulate some principle to indicate that it made
other than an arbitrary choice to favor women over fetuses. How-
ever, "nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion provides a satisfac-
tory explanation of why the fetal interest should not be deemed
overriding prior to viability, particularly when a legislative major-
ity chose to regard the fetus as a human being from the moment of
conception. 20 2 Thus, one of the most frequent criticisms of Roe v.
Wade is precisely this failure to justify rhetorically why the state
did not have a compelling interest in protecting fetal life. 0 3
Second, the Court failed to adequately justify why the right to
abortion varied depending on the trimester of pregnancy. The
Court held that during the first trimester of pregnancy the abor-
tion decision must be left entirely to the woman and her physi-
20cian. 04 During the second trimester the "State, in promoting its
interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the
abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal
health. ' 20 5 And the state may even prohibit abortion after the fe-
tus reaches viability, during the third trimester.20 6 But what princi-
ple justifies the Court drawing the distinction between the second
and third trimesters? Is not the choice of viability as the time after
which abortion is prohibited just as arbitrary as banning abortion
after conception? The Court has frequently been criticized for fail-
ing to articulate any principle justifying why it drew lines the way
201. L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 927.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 53
(1976) ("[T]he opinion fails to even consider what I would suppose to be the most compel-
ling interest of the State in prohibiting abortion: the interest in maintaining that respect for
the paramount sanctity of human life which has always been at the centre of western civili-
zation . . ").
204. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 164.
205. Id. The Court determined that during the second trimester, the State's compelling
interest in the health of the mother justified interference in the abortion procedure. Prior to
the end of the first trimester, however, abortion mortality rates are as low or lower as those
for normal childbirth. Id. at 149.
206. Id. at 164-65.
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that it did.207 Rhetorically, the Court's decision lacks legitimacy
because it seems to be an arbitrary, unjustified set of choices.
Thus, the key question to be asked about Roe v. Wade is not
whether the Court should have defined life as beginning at concep-
tion or left the matter for the legislature. The inquiry must be
whether there was another, rhetorically more acceptable alterna-
tive that the Court should have chosen.
III. ABORTION AS A PRIVATE MORAL JUDGMENT: REPACKAGING
ROE V. WADE
Rhetorically, the best approach to the abortion issue would
have been for the Court to declare that the decision whether to
have an abortion is a private moral judgment which the state may
not encourage, discourage, or prohibit. The Court could have held
that a woman has the right at any point during her pregnancy to
remove the fetus from her body.208 The state may set standards to
insure that the fetus is removed in the manner most likely to guar-
antee its survival and it may require all steps necessary to keep the
fetus alive once removed. 20 9 But whether the fetus will or will not
survive removal is irrelevant to the legal status of a woman's right
to terminate her pregnancy. 1° A state cannot constitutionally
make the moral judgment for a woman as to whether abortion is
right or wrong. This approach overcomes the problems of Roe v.
Wade, and while it is not without flaws, it could be defended as
principled, non-arbitrary, and consistent with precedents.
First, the Court could articulate a legal principle to support its
decision: it is the right of a person to decide what happens in and
to his or her body.211 The state cannot compel a person to use her
body to keep another person alive. A corollary of this principle is
that it is a private moral judgment for each person to make as to
whether and how her body will be used to sustain another life,
207. Epstein, supra note 8, at 182.
208. See Thomson, supra note 155, at 22.
209. For a summary of the legal status of laws requiring steps to protect the potential
life of an aborted fetus, see, C.D. WARDLE, THE ABORTION-PRIVACY DOcTRINE: A COMPEN-
DIUM AND CRITIQUE OF FEDERAL COURT ABORTION CASES 181-96 (1980).
210. This "principle would permit her to remove the fetus, without damaging it, assum-
ing that were possible, even if it were known that the fetus would die because no other
carrier could be found." Regan, supra note 69, at 9.
211. Thomson, supra note 155, at 6.
[Vol. 31
19821 RATIONALIZING THE ABORTION DEBATE 143
which obviously decides the abortion question. The state cannot
constitutionally compel a woman to use her body as an incuba-
tor.2 12 In light of the burden imposed on a woman by forcing her to
continue a pregnancy against her will, 213 the Court could hold that
it is entirely for each woman to decide whether or not to have an
abortion.
Second, such a principle avoids arbitrary line-drawing by the
Court. There is no need to decide whether or not the fetus is a
person or at what point life begins.214 Even if the fetus is regarded
as a human life, the state constitutionally may not compel a wo-
man to give up her body for nine months to sustain that life. Just
as parents can choose to give their children up for adoption, so
may a woman at any point during her pregnancy remove the fetus
from her body.215 The state, however, as indicated earlier, may set
standards to best insure the fetus' chance of survival outside the
womb and may take any steps it chooses to sustain the infant once
separated.218
Furthermore, under this approach there is no need for an arbi-
trary balancing of the woman's rights versus those of the fetus.21
The fetus may have a right to life, but not a right to be kept in a
woman's body against her will. 218 It is not a matter of arbitrarily
favoring women as a group over fetuses. Rather, there is a princi-
ple of body control which can be rhetorically justified under the
Constitution, and this principle makes abortion a private moral
choice.
In fact, given the total lack of consensus as to when life begins,
212. Some have suggested that abortion laws do not compel a woman to be an incuba-
tor because they did not compel a woman to become pregnant to begin with. See Warren,
On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion, in TODAY'S MORAL PROBS. 125 (R. Wasserstrom
ed. 1979). It is impossible, however, to regard pregnancy as an entirely voluntary condition.
Entirely apart from involuntary pregnancies due to rape, even "[i]f contraceptive methods
of very high effectiveness, say 98%, were used carefully and consistently, there would be
hundreds of thousands of pregnancies caused by contraceptive failure." Regan, supra note
69, at 28. As such, it is inaccurate and unjust to women to regard pregnancy as a purely
voluntary condition. Id. at 66.
213. Many commentators have concluded that the burden of pregnancy is so great that
"women should have complete control over pregnancy." Liu, supra note 61, at 147.
214. Regan, supra note 69, at 74.
215. Thomson, supra note 155, at 22.
216. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 145, 412 subd. 3(3) (1974).
217. Epstein, supra note 8, at 182-83.
218. Warren, supra note 212, at 135.
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it is only appropriate to leave the question entirely up to each wo-
man.219 Individuals and religious groups have sharply divergent
and irreconcilable views on the morality of abortion.2 While ev-
eryone can agree that an individual capable of surviving outside
the uterus should be protected, consensus will never be reached as
to the legitimacy of protecting a fetus by compelling continuation
of a pregnancy.221 The fact of disagreement is in itself relevant to
the Court in justifying its opinion.222 The Court simply could rec-
ognize that given the tremendous disagreement on the matter, it
should be left to each woman to decide for herself whether abor-
tion is right or wrong. The Court could find that abortion is not a
proper subject for a public moral judgment expressed in the crimi-
nal law. 23 Professor Robert Bennett explains the distinction be-
tween criminal abortion statutes and other laws:
First, criminal statutes often reflect values that are held with near unanimity
in the society. Even most 'murderers' likely do not think that they are being
treated unfairly if they are severely punished for their crimes. In contrast,
doctors and women and others involved in abortions usually feel little culpa-
bility, because the society is sharply divided about whether substantial culpa-
bility attends an abortion. Second, outside the abortion context criminal stat-
utes seldom burden innocent individuals, except perhaps incidentally ....
Under criminal abortion statutes like that in Texas, however, the greatest
burden fell upon women desiring abortions, whose own conduct in obtaining
abortions was apparently not defined as criminal .... Third, and perhaps
most importantly, even relatively unpopular criminal laws usually impose lit-
tle in the way of burdens on those capable of obedience 12 4
Thus, the Court could rationally distinguish laws prohibiting abor-
tion from other criminal statutes expressing a public moral judg-
ment and hold that abortion is a matter of private, not public,
morals.
Finally, such an approach to the abortion issue would be con-
sistent with precedents. The Court would be following the holding
of Eisenstadt: that it is a fundamental right to decide whether to
219. Knowton, Law, Morality, and Abortion, 22 RUTGERs L. REv. 415, 430 (1968). See
also Blake, supra note 71, at 73.
220. See generally*F. JAFFE, B. LINDHEIM & P. LEE, ABORTION POLITICS: PRIVATE MO-
RALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1981).
221. D. CALLAHAN, supra note 20, at 493-94.
222. Knowton, supra note 219, at 430.
223. Id. at 429 ("purely moral solutions should not be enforced by criminal sanction
unless there is widespread agreement on the solution").
224. Bennett, supra note 153, at 1007.
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"bear or beget a child. '225 In fact, the Court's clear articulation of
a person's right to make decisions concerning her body would help
to clarify the meaning of the constitutional right to privacy. 226
Moreover, this approach would be consistent with traditional tort
and criminal law principles. It "is a deeply rooted principle of
American law that an individual is ordinarily not required to vol-
unteer aid to another individual who is in danger or need of assis-
tance: ... our law does not require people to be Good Samari-
tans.''227 Just as the law does not require individuals to donate
body organs to save other people's lives, so should the state not
require a woman to donate her body, against her will, to house a
fetus.228
The result would be the same as that of Roe v. Wade: state
laws banning abortion would be overturned. In fact, it is even pos-
sible to read Roe v. Wade as endorsing the thesis of this approach.
Professor Tribe observed: "Roe v. Wade represents less a decision
in favor of abortion than a decision in favor of leaving the matter,
however it might come out in particular cases, to women rather
than legislative majorities. '22 9 What is different about this ap-
proach is its rhetoric. It avoids drawing arbitrary lines, such as the
point of viability, after which abortions are not allowed. Further-
more, it overcomes the need to balance interests that can never be
logically balanced. Rhetorically, it is the most defensible approach
to an irresolvable problem. But most importantly, the advantage of
viewing abortion as a private moral judgment is that it provides
guidance for resolution of other questions in the abortion
controversy.
IV. THE CONTROVERSY CONTINUES: TOWARDS PRINCIPLED
RESOLUTION. OF ABORTION ISSUES
Roe v. Wade did not by any measure end the legal debate over
abortion issues. There has been at least one major abortion case
before the Supreme Court in almost every term since 1973.230 Re-
225. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 453.
226. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup.
CT. REV. 173, 214, 216 (1980).
227. Regan, supra note 69, at 3.
228. See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 206-07 (1974).
229. L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 933.
230. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
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garding abortion as a private moral judgment would provide a
principled way of dealing with other aspects of the abortion con-
troversy. For example, consider three major abortion issues left un-
resolved by Roe v. Wade: is refusal to publicly fund abortions for
indigent women unconstitutional; may Congress enact a law pursu-
ant to section 5 of the 14th Amendment defining the fetus as a
person; and may states impose requirements for "informed" con-
sent or mandatory waiting periods? Each of these difficult ques-
tions could be more easily resolved if the Court were to regard the
question of whether to have an abortion as entirely a matter for
each woman to decide.
A. The Abortion Funding Controversy
1. The abortion funding cases. The question of whether leg-
islatures can deny public funding of abortions has produced the
greatest amount of litigation of all the abortion issues." 1 Since
1973, local, state and federal governments have enacted restric-
tions on the use of government funds to pay for abortions.232 The
Supreme Court considered the constitutional validity of these
spending limits in two sets of cases decided in 1977 and 1980.
In 1977, in three cases handed down on the same day, Beal v.
Doe, 233 Maher v. Roe,3 4 and Poelker v. Doe,35 the Supreme Court
sustained restrictions on public subsidies of abortions. In Beal v.
(1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979);
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432
U.S. 438 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
231. C.D. WARDLE, supra note 209, at 214.
232. See, e.g., Department of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare Appropriations
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-480, §210, 92 Stat. 1586 (1978). Additionally, over 40 states
enacted substantial abortion funding restrictions. C.D. WARDLE, supra note 209, at 215
n.285. The lower federal courts reviewing these restrictions consistently held that the denial
of public funds for abortions was unconstitutional. See, e.g., Roe v. Ferguson, 515 F.2d 279
(6th Cir. 1975); Doe v. Roe, 499 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1974); Klein v. Nassau County Medical
Center, 409 F. Supp. 731 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Doe v. Westby, 383 F. Supp. 1143 (W.D.S.D.
1974); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. (E.D. Pa. 1975). Likewise, the
lower federal court required public hospitals to pay for abortions. See, e.g., Doe v. Mundy,
514 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1975); Doe v. Hale Hosp., 500 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 907 (1975); Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed,
419 U.S. 891 (1974).
233. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
234. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
235. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
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Doe the Court held that Title XIX of the Social Security Act does
not require Pennsylvania to fund non-therapeutic abortions as a
condition of participating in the Medicaid program established by
that Act.2 38 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, concluded that
the Federal Medicaid law "confers broad discretion on the States
to adopt standards for determining the extent of medical assis-
tance requiring only that such standards be 'reasonable' and 'con-
sistent with the objectives' of the Act. '287 Pennsylvania's refusal to
fund non-therapeutic abortions was permissible because "it is
hardly inconsistent with the objectives of the Act for a State to
refuse to fund unnecessary - though perhaps desirable - medical
services. '28s Beal focused primarily on the statutory question of
whether failure to fund Medicaid abortions was a violation of the
Social Security Act.
In Maher v. Roe, the Court held that Connecticut's refusal to
publicly subsidize non-therapeutic abortions, while paying ex-
penses incidental to childbirth, did not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.289 The Court reaffirmed the earlier holdings in San
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez'40 and Dandridge v. Wil-
liams,' 1 that financial need alone does not identify a basis for
strict scrutiny under equal protection analysis.2 2 The Court con-
cluded that the "Connecticut regulation does not impinge upon the
fundamental right [of privacy] recognized in Roe" that protects a
woman from interference with her freedom to decide whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy.
243
Finally, in Poelker v. Doe the Court, in a per curiam opinion,
held that the city of St. Louis did not violate the Constitution by
providing publicly financed hospital services for childbirth but not
for non-therapeutic abortions. Relying especially on the reasoning
in Maher, the Court held that public hospitals are not obligated to
provide abortions, even if they supply childbirth services.4
All three of these 1977 cases dealt with state and local refusals
236. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 443-47.
237. Id. at 444.
238. Id. at 444-45.
239. Id. at 469-80.
240. 411 U.S. 1, 19 (1973).
241. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
242. 432 U.S. at 471. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
243. Id. at 474.
244. Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 521.
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to fund non-therapeutic abortions. In two 1980 decisions, the
Court sustained federal and state denials of funding for even medi-
cally necessary abortions. In Harris v. McRae 45 the Court rejected
a variety of constitutional challenges to the Hyde Amendment
which drastically limited public funding for abortions. Since 1976,
Congress has prohibited through the Hyde Amendment to the ap-
propriations for the Department of Health and Human Services,
the use of federal funds to reimburse the costs of abortions.24 '0 In
Harris the Court, relying on the earlier decision in Maher, sus-
tained congressional authority to deny funding of even medically
necessary abortions.247 Likewise, in a companion case, Williams v.
Zbaraz,248 the Court, in a 5-4 decision, upheld an Illinois law bar-
ring public funding for abortions except those "necessary for the
preservation of the life of the woman seeking such treatment. ' '249
The Court held that the state had neither a constitutional nor a
statutory duty to subsidize abortions.
The Court based its decisions in all five of these cases on iden-
tical arguments. First, the Court repeatedly stated that the Consti-
tution "imposes no obligation on the States to pay the pregnancy-
related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to pay any
of the medical expenses of indigents."250 That is, the fact that
there is a right to abortions does not obligate the state to pay for
them. Although the Constitution prevents the state from interfer-
ing with a woman's choice concerning abortion, "it does not confer
an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all of
the advantages of that freedom. '25 1 The Court analogized the right
to abortion to other constitutional safeguards, such as the right to
245. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
246. See, e.g., Department of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropria-
tions Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 210, 92 Stat. 1586 (1978):
None of the funds provided for in this Act shall be used to perform abortions
except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were car-
ried to term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for the victims of
rape or incest, when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law
enforcement agency or public health service; or except in those instances where
severe and long lasting physical health damage to the mother would result if the
pregnancy were carried to term when so determined by two physicians.
247. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 300-27 (1980).
248. 448 U.S. 358 (1980).
249. Id. at 360-61.
250. Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 469.
251. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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use contraceptives and the rights of parents to send their children
to parochial schools. s5 The fact that these rights are protected
from government interference does not mean that the "government
* . . has an affirmative constitutional obligation to ensure that all
persons have the financial resources to obtain contraceptives or
send their children to private schools. 2 s53 The Court concluded:
To translate the limitation on governmental power implicit in the Due Pro-
cess Clause into an affirmative funding obligation would require Congress to
subsidize the medically necessary abortion of an indigent woman even if Con-
gress had not enacted a Medicaid program to subsidize other medically neces-
sary services. Nothing in the Due Process Clause supports such an extraordi-
nary result. Whether freedom of choice that is constitutionally protected
warrants federal subsidization is a question for Congress to answer, not a
matter for constitutional entitlement.2 '
Second, in all of the cases the Court held that the legislature
could choose to encourage childbirth by paying for it, while refus-
ing to subsidize abortions. In Beal the Court noted that it was not
"unreasonable for a participating State to further this unquestion-
ably strong and legitimate interest in encouraging normal child-
birth" by paying for childbirth and excluding abortions.2 55 Simi-
larly, in Maher the Court held that a state may "make a value
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion and . . . implement
that judgment by the allocation of public funds."2 5 Most recently,
in Harris v. McRae257 the Court ruled:
[The] Hyde amendment, by encouraging childbirth except in the most urgent
circumstances, is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective
of protecting potential life.. . . Nor is it irrational that Congress has author-
ized federal reimbursement for medically necessary services generally, but
252. Id.; 432 U.S. at 477. In Maher, the Court emphasized the analogy to parochial
schools: that while parents have a constitutional right to send their children to parochial
school that does not create an affirmative obligation for the government to subsidize paro-
chial schools. The Court observed that finding a public obligation to pay for abortions would
by analogy require government subsidies of parochial education. ("Yet, were we to accept
appellees' argument, an indigent parent could challenge the state policy of favoring public
rather than private schools, or of preferring instruction in English rather than German, on
grounds identical in principle to those advanced here.") 432 U.S. at 477.
253. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 318.
254. Id.
255. 432 U.S. at 446.
256. 432 U.S. at 474. See also Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 521 ("the Constitution does
not forbid a state or city, pursuant to democratic processes, from expressing a preference for
normal childbirth as St. Louis has done").
257. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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not for certain medically necessary abortions. Abortion is inherently different
from other medical procedures, because no other procedure involves the pur-
poseful termination of a potential life.'"
Thus, in all of the abortion funding cases the Court held that legis-
latures may use public funds to create an incentive in favor of
childbirth and a disincentive to have an abortion.
Finally, in all of these decisions the Court held that there is a
difference between prohibiting abortions and merely discouraging
them by refusing to appropriate funds to pay for them. The Court
ruled that the government's refusal to subsidize abortions "leaves
an indigent woman with at least the same range of choice in decid-
ing whether to have a medically necessary abortion as she would
have had if Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care costs
at all.1 259 While the government may not impose barriers prevent-
ing women from obtaining abortions, there is no obligation that the
government alleviate those obstacles to obtaining abortions caused
by indigency.260 Even if the effect of not funding abortions is to
limit their accessibility for poor women, refusal to subsidize abor-
tions is not an unconstitutional interference with a protected right.
Ultimately, the Court decided that the question of whether or
not the government should subsidize abortions is a matter for the
legislature to decide:
The decision whether to expend state funds for non-therapeutic abortion is
fraught with judgments of policy and value over which opinions are sharply
divided .. .. Indeed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as
those implicated by public funding of non-therapeutic abortions, the appro-
priate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature." 1
2. Abortion as a private moral judgment and the abortion
funding issue. As the above discussion indicates, the Supreme
Court's decisions in the abortion funding cases were premised on
the assumptions that the government has a valid interest in dis-
couraging abortion and that there is a difference between prohibit-
ing abortion and creating an incentive in favor of childbirth.
Neither of these assumptions would be consistent with the view
that abortion is a private moral judgment. That is, had the Court
held that the question of whether to have an abortion is entirely
258. Id. at 325.
259. Id. at 316.
260. Id.
261. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 479; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 336.
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for each woman to decide, then in order to be rhetorically consis-
tent the Court would have had to decide the abortion funding
cases differently.
Initially, it must be recognized that the distinction between
discouraging abortions and prohibiting them is meaningless for
many indigent women. The effect of the refusal to pay for abortion
is to compel many women to bear and have children.262 Even the
Court recognized that failure to fund abortions under Medicaid
programs meant that some women would be forced to forego abor-
tions28 In fact, the undeniable purpose of the funding restrictions
was to accomplish precisely such a decrease in abortions .26  The
government did not refuse to subsidize abortions as a way to save
money: childbirth is much more expensive than abortion. Justice
Stevens observed in his dissent in Harris, that one lower court
found that while publicly funded abortions cost an average of less
than $150, the average cost to the state of childbirth exceeded
$1350.265 Clearly then, "[a]bortion funding restrictions are not en-
acted for the sake of frugality or to encourage the welfare client to
practice contraception or sexual self-restraint. 268 The sole purpose
262. Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role in
American Government, 66 GEo. L.J. 1191, 1244 (1978) (the decisions "mean that some indi-
gent women, perhaps many, will be unable to have abortions. These are the very same wo-
men most likely to have unwanted pregnancies and least able to accomodate additional chil-
dren."). Empirically, studies have shown a decrease in abortions as a result of funding
cutbacks. One study of the impact of the Hyde Amendment in Ohio and Georgia indicates
that over twenty percent of the women Medicaid recipients who desired an abortion could
not get one because of the absence of funds. Trussell, Menken, Lindheim & Vaughn, The
Impact of Restriction of Medicard Funds for Abortion, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 120 (1980).
263. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1980).
264. Perry, Why the Supreme Court was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment
Cases: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STkN. L. Rv. 1113, 1125-26 (1980). It is
possible to hypothesize other motives for the funding restrictions other than an attempt to
decrease abortions. For example, one possible purpose of prohibiting government funds
from being used for abortions would be to protect taxpayers from having their dollars spent
for something they abhor. See Hardy, Privacy and Public Funding: Maher v. Roe as the
Interaction of Roe v. Wade and Dandridge v. Williams, 18 Aniz. L. RE V. 903, 937-38 (1976).
Such a purpose, however, was at best secondary in the minds of legislators whose primary
objective was to decrease abortions. See generally Note, The Effect of Recent Medicaid
Decisions on a Constitutional Right: Abortions Only for the Rich, 6 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 687
(1978). Furthermore, taxpayers are not protected from subsidizing other programs they dis-
agree with, even if they believe their dollars are being used for murder (e.g., expenditures
for the Vietnam War or foreign aid to totalitarian governments).
265. 448 U.S. 297, 355 n. 9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F.
Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill. 1979), vacated and remanded, 448 U.S. 358 (1980)).
266. Horan & Marzan, The Moral Interest of the State in Abortion Funding: A Coin-
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of the funding restrictions was to decrease the number of
abortions.
26 7
The question, therefore, is whether the government may enact
laws which have the purpose and effect of preventing abortions. If
abortion is viewed as a private moral judgment, then the decision
whether to bear or abort the fetus is to be left entirely to each
pregnant woman. The state must adopt a position of neutrality.268
The government may not take actions which have the purpose and
effect of preventing abortions since those policies by definition
deny a woman the right to make an autonomous decision.2 9 The
whole point of the fifth approach, regarding abortion as a matter of
private and not public morals, is that the state may not involve
itself in the choice of whether or not to have an abortion. The laws
restricting use of government funds for abortion were intended to
do exactly what should not be allowed: publicly interfere with a
private decision. If the Court were to treat abortion as a purely
private decision, then it could not consistently hold that the state
has a legitimate interest in protecting "potential life.
'27 0
The point is not that the government has an affirmative duty
to subsidize abortions, or any other medical procedure. 27 1 Rather,
the point is that the government may not use its resources and
power to prevent abortions.2 2 The government is under no obliga-
tion to subsidize childbirth expenses. But if it chooses to do so,
since childbirth and abortion are the only possible outcomes of
pregnancy, it must also subsidize abortions. The state may not
make the moral judgment about whether the fetus should be
aborted, and it may not attempt to coerce decisions through its
power of the purse.
ment on Beal, Maher and Poelker, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 566, 573 (1978).
267. Id. at 573.
268. See Perry, supra note 264, at 1115-16, 1122 (the government may not enact poli-
cies based on the belief that abortion is morally objectionable).
269. Goldstein, A Critique of the Abortion Funding Decisions: On Private Rights in
the Public Sector, 8 HASTINGS CONsT. L. Q. 313, 340-42 (1981).
270. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980) (abortion unique because it involves
"potential" life).
271. Cf. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: Its Hour Come Round at
Last?, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q 405; Michelman, supra note 38; Tribe, Unravelling Nat'l League
of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services,
90 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1977) (argument for a constitutional right to government services
based on equal protection, privileges or immunities, and federalism).
272. Perry, supra note 264, at 1125-26.
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This is hardly a novel conclusion. The Court repeatedly has
held that "states burden fundamental interests involving freedom
of choice when they threaten to withhold or withdraw such discre-
tionary benefits unless a person exercises his or her constitution-
ally protected option in a particular way. '' 27 For example, in the
area of free exercise of religion, the Court has rejected any distinc-
tion between prohibiting and discouraging religious conduct. In
cases such as Sherbert v. Verner27 4 and Thomas v. Review Board
of Indiana,2 7 5 the Court has rejected as unconstitutional state
funding schemes that have the effect of discouraging individuals
from following their religious beliefs.2 6 Just as religion is a matter
of individual conscience which the state may not try to influence,
so must the abortion decision be left to each woman, uninfluenced
by the state.2 " In fact, if the Court were to take the approach to
the abortion issue suggested above, it would be declaring a right to
"free exercise" in making abortion decisions. Government discour-
agement is per se inconsistent with individual free exercise.
This concept of "free exercise" in the area of abortion deci-
sions shows the fallacy of the Court's analogy between the govern-
ment's refusal to fund abortions and its failure to subsidize paro-
chial schools. The Court rightly noted that while the state could
not prevent children from attending private schools, that did not
mean that the state has an obligation to pay for parochial educa-
tion.275 The Court drew the analogy to abortions, concluding that
273. Simson, Abortion, Poverty, and the Equal Protection of the Laws, 13 GA. L. REV.
505, 509 (1979).
274. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (worker who quit a job rather than work in contradiction to
her religious belief requiring observance of Sabbath was entitled to unemployment
compensation).
275. 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (worker who quit his job rather than work in a job requiring
production of armaments was entitled to unemployment compensation).
276. See Wilcox, Invasions of the First Amendment through Conditioned Public
Spending, 41 CORNELL L. Q. 12 (1955).
277. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, attempted to distinquish failure to fund
abortions from refusing to pay unemployment compensation to workers who quit their jobs
for religious reasons. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 478. Powell argued that Sherbert is not
analogous because it involved withholding of benefits from persons who were otherwise enti-
tled to the benefits on the ground that those persons exercised a fundamental right. 432
U.S. at 474-75 n.8. But this argument begs the key question: by funding childbirth and not
abortion is not the state penalizing women who choose to exercise their fundamental right
to have an abortion? See also Goldstein, supra note 269, at 327-34.
278. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 477, citing Norwood
v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973).
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while the state may not prohibit abortions, it has no obligation to
subsidize them. Though this analogy seems plausible at first, it
does not withstand critical analysis. First, private and public edu-
cation are functionally the same. If a student cannot afford private
education, the student still receives an education. By contrast, if a
pregnant woman cannot afford an abortion, she has a baby. Abor-
tion and childbirth obviously are not alike. The state's choice to
fund public and not parochial schools has an effect different in
kind from its choice to fund childbirth and not abortions.
Second, the purpose of the government's failure to fund paro-
chial schools is different from its motive for not paying for abor-
tions. At the very least, the state's failure to subsidize private
schools is a simple resource allocation decision29 The state is not
hostile to parochial education, but instead, chooses to put its
scarce resources in a single school system.28 The state's motive for
funding only public education is not to prevent students from at-
tending parochial schools. By denying funds for abortions, how-
ever, the government's purpose is to prevent, in the only way avail-
able to the state, abortions. 81 It is not a matter of resource
allocation because the government is willing to pay for the more
expensive medical procedures attendant to childbirth.282 Especially
in the last decade, the Court has made clear that the purpose of a
law is relevant in deciding its constitutionality. 283 The purpose of
denying funds for abortion while providing funds for childbirth is
impermissible: interference with the "free exercise" of indigent wo-
men's decision-making authority.
Finally, the Court's analogy to funding of parochial schools is
specious because the government could not constitutionally subsi-
dize parochial education even if it wanted to do so. Government
funding of parochial schools would violate the Establishment
279. See L. TRIBE, supra note 14.
280. Cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (state discretion to control resource
allocation decisions).
281. F. JAFFEE, B. LINDHEIM & P. LEE, supra note 220, at 127.
282. One study suggests that if only one-third of the Medicaid women having abortions
had to carry their pregnancies to term the increased cost to the government would be over
$200 million a year. Lincoln, Daring-Bradley, Lindheim & Cotterill, The Court, the Con-
gress, and the President's Turning Back the Clock on the Pregnant Poor, 9 FAM. PLAN.
PERSp. 207 (1977).
283. See Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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Clause of the First Amendment.28 4 Therefore, the failure to fund
parochial schools is not at all similar to the failure to pay for abor-
tions. In the former the state has no choice since it cannot act,
whereas in the latter the state is making an impermissible choice
to discourage abortions.
Simply stated, the ambiguous rhetoric of Roe v. Wade made it
possible for the Court in the abortion funding cases to sustain bans
of public subsidies while at the same time appearing to be consis-
tent with Roe v. Wade. If, however, the Court took the position
that abortion is a private moral judgment, it would be impossible
to sustain statutes whose purpose was to prevent abortions. Again,
it is clear that rhetoric does shape results and the best rhetoric for
the abortion question would be to regard abortion as a private
moral choice.
B. Abortion as a Private Moral Judgment and the Human Life
Bill
While the abortion funding questions already have been de-
cided by the Court, there looms in the future an even more troub-
ling issue: can Congress by statute ban all abortions? The vehicle
for accomplishing such a prohibition would be the so-called
Human Life Bill. 285 Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that "Congress shall have the power to enforce by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article."28 The Human
Life Bill proposes that, pursuant to this authority, Congress define
the fetus as a person from the time of conception. 87 0As such, fe-
tuses would be entitled to due process and equal protection of the
laws from the moment of fertilization. The proposed bill provides:
284. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 446 U.S. 646 (1980); Levitt v.
Comm. for Public Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Lemon v. Kurlzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
285. 127 CoNG. REC. 9, S287-94 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1981).
286. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
287. 127 CONG. REC. 9, S287-94 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1981). Additionally, section two of
the Act would prevent federal courts from issuing an injunction or declaratory judgment
invalidating any state law protecting fetuses or restricting abortions. The constitutionality
of such a limit on federal court jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally
Eisenburg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE,
L.J. 498 (1974); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 H~Av. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Redish & Woods, Congressional
Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New
Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1975).
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The Congress finds that present day scientific evidence'indicates a significant
likelihood that actual human life exists from conception. The Congress
further finds that the 14th Amendment to the Constitution was intended to
protect all human beings. Upon the basis of these findings. . . the Congress
hereby declares that for the purpose of enforcing the obligation of the states
under the 14th Amendment not to deprive persons of life without due process
of law, human life shall be deemed to exist from conception. . . ; and for this
purpose 'person' shall include all human life defined herein.
2 8
Historically, congressional authority under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment was limited to legislation invalidating
state laws deemed to violate section one of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment or to provide remedies for state infringement of section
one.289 However, in Katzenbach v. Morgan,90 the Supreme Court
upheld broad congressional authority to expand the protections of
the post Civil War amendments. Katzenbach involved a challenge
to a federal statute which had the effect of overturning a Supreme
Court decision. Previously, in Lassiter v. Northampton County
Board of Elections,9 1 the Court ruled that literacy tests as a vot-
ing qualification did not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendment. A few years after the Lassiter decision, Congress, in
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, provided that no person who has
successfully completed the sixth grade in an accredited Spanish-
language Puerto Rican school may be denied the right to vote be-
cause of an inability to read or write English.292 A group of New
York voters brought suit to challenge the congressional invalida-
tion of that state's literacy test. The plaintiffs contended that Con-
gress had no authority to act under the Fourteenth Amendment
because the Court had already decided that there was no constitu-
tional violation.
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim and sus-
tained the federal statute. The Court held that Congress could jus-
tify striking down the literacy requirement in order to aid the Pu-
erto Rican community to gain sufficient political clout to obtain
288. S. 158, Ch. 101 § 1, CONG. REC. supra note 285, at S287.
289. Gordon, The Nature and Uses of Congressional Power Under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment to Overcome Decisions of the Supreme Court, 72 Nw. L. R.v. 656
(1977); see, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339
(1879).
290. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
291. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
292. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(e)(1)(2) (1976).
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non-discriminatory treatment in the provision of public services.2 93
Additionally the Court concluded that Congress, on its own, could
find that literacy tests violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments and ban such tests under the grants of legislative au-
thority contained in the Amendments.294 This latter holding grants
to Congress broad authority to interpret the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment and to enact legislation to implement those
interpretations.295
Proponents of the Human Life Bill contend that Congress
may use this authority to define the meaning of the term "person"
in the Fourteenth Amendment. The argument is that Roe v. Wade
was premised on the Court's inability to define when human life
begins.298 Congress, therefore, according to the bill's sponsors, can
remedy the situation by defining the fetus as a person, guarantee-
ing it full constitutional rights from the moment of conception.297
The intended result is a total ban on all abortions.298
The Court's rhetoric in Roe v. Wade makes the arguments for
the Human Life Bill at least plausible. The Court admitted that its
decision depended on finding that the fetus was not a person.2 9
Furthermore, the Court premised its conclusion on its inability to
define when human life begins.300 Advocates of the Human Life
Bill suggest that Congress should step into the picture and use its
authority to define life as beginning at conception. The result ac-
cording to proponents would be that fetuses would be legally enti-
tled to the status of persons and abortions would be banned.301
If, however, the Court took the rhetorical approach that abor-
293. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652-53. See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966).
294. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653-56. See also City of Rome v. United States,
446 U.S. 156 (1980); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
295. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 73, at 691-92.
296. Galebach, A Human Life Statute, reprinted in 127 CONG. REc. S287, S288 (daily
ed. Jan. 19, 1981).
297. Id.
298. Id. at S297.
299. 410 U.S. at 156-57 ("If the suggestion of personhood is established, the appellants
case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by
the Amendment").
300. Id. at 159.
301. This assumes that "life" and "persons" are synonymous. For a thoughtful refuta-
tion of that assumption, see Kolb, The Proposed Human Life Statute: Abortion as Murder,
67 A.B.A.J. 1123, 1124 (1981).
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tion is a private moral judgment, then the Human Life Bill would
be clearly unconstitutional. 02 Recall that this approach would
have the Court hold that the state may not command one person
to use their body to help another.3 03 If abortion is a private moral
judgment, then women have the right to remove fetuses from their
bodies even if the fetus is a person and even if removal will kill
that person. Thus, even granting Congress authority under section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment to define "person" as including
a fetus,3 ' the Human Life Bill would still be unconstitutional.
By declaring that bans on abortion are unconstitutional be-
cause they infringe on private moral decisions, the Court would
make clear that its decision was based on a normative judgment
and not on an empirical inability to decide when life begins. This
is crucial because the "familiar words of Marbury v. Madison that
it is the judicial department's province to 'declare the law' mean[s]
- . .that Congress cannot alter the normative component of a judi-
cial decision.3 05 At most, Katzenbach v. Morgan0 6 allows Congress
to change the 'empirical component' of a Court decision."30" Thus,
Congress would be powerless to overturn the Court's judgment
that each woman has the right to control her body, including the
right to remove a fetus. The point is not that invalidation of the
Human Life Bill is only possible under the approach suggested
here.303 Rather, the argument is that it is clearer and rhetorically
302. It should be noted that a statute virtually identical to the Human Life Bill was
enacted by Rhode Island and declared unconstitutional. Doe v. Israel, 358 F. Supp. 1193
(D.C.R.I.) afrd mem., 482 F.2d. 1156 (1st Cir. 1973); cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
303. See supra text accompanying notes 208-13.
304. Strong arguments can be advanced that Congress does not have such authority
under section 5. See, e.g., Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal
Protection, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 603, 620 (1975):
If there is a new round of debate in the Court concerning the limit of congres-
sional power under section 5 of the 14th Amendment, it is most likely to arise in
the context of a congressional attempt to clip the wings of an unpopular due
process or equal protection decision of the Court . . . .Recognizing the func-
tional distinction betweeen judgments drawing lines as to allocation of power
within the federal system and those establishing the minimum content of consti-
tutionally protected liberty leaves no room for congressional dilution of the Bill
of Rights.
305. Gordon, supra note 289, at 631.
306. 384 U.S. 651 (1966).
307. Gordon, supra note 89, at 671.
308. It is quite likely that the Court would come to the same result if the Human Life
Bill was enacted and challenged. See 127 CONG. REtc. E2267 (daily ed. May 12, 1981) (re-
printed letter from Prof. Henkin to Rep. Don Edwards).
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easier to justify why the Human Life Bill is unconstitutional if
abortion is viewed as a private moral choice.
C. State Laws Requiring "Informed Consent" and Mandatory
Waiting Periods
In addition to the issues discussed above, regarding abortion
as a private moral judgment would provide guidance for resolution
of challenges to a number of state and local statutes restricting ac-
cess to abortions which are currently pending before the Supreme
Court.309 Perhaps the most important issues to be decided are the
constitutionality of state imposed "informed consent" and
mandatory waiting period requirements. Sixteen states have en-
acted laws requiring that women be provided detailed information
before undergoing an abortion.3 10 The woman is required, by stat-
ute, to sign a statement that she has been informed and voluntarily
chooses to have an abortion understanding the information pro-
vided. In addition, eleven states have enacted statutes requiring
that there be a twenty-four or forty-eight hour waiting period be-
tween the time a woman signs the informed consent and the time
the abortion is performed.311 If abortion is viewed as a private
309. Simopoulous v. Virginia, 221 Va. 1059, 227 S.E.2d 205 (1981), cert. granted, 50
U.S.L.W. 3927 (May 25, 1982) (No. 86-212). (Simopoulous involves the constitutionality of
the state statute which requires that all abortions past the first trimester be performed in a
hospital). See Planned Parenthood Ass'n. v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1981); supple-
mented, 664 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3920 (May 25, 1982) (No.
81-1255) (Ashcroft involves challenges to a parental consent provision for minors, a require-
ment that a second physician be present during all second trimester abortions, a require-
ment that all abortions past the twelfth week be performed in a hospital, and a requirement
that a pathology report be done on all medically aborted fetuses); Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3928
(May 25, 1982) (No. 81-746) (Akron involves challenges to a municipal ordinance requiring
the physician to disclose information concerning the fetus to the woman and requiring a 24
hour waiting period between the time the woman signs the informed consent and the time
the abortion is performed).
310. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2555 (1969); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1794 (1979); IDAHO
CODE, § 18-609 (1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-23(2) (1975); 1980 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
112, § 12(s); (Michiel Law Coop); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412, subdiv. 1(4) (West 1974); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 188.039 (1974); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 50-20-104(3) (1974); NEBR. REV. STAT.
§ 28-326(8) (1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02(5) (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6602
(Purdon); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4-2 (1981); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-10.1 (1980);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-302 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305.5 (1981); VA. CODE § 18.2-76
(1975).
311. DEL. CODE tit. 24, § 1794(b) (1979) (24 hour waiting period); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38
§ 81-23.2 (1975) (24 hour waiting period); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-2 (Burns 1977) (24
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moral judgment, as advocated in this Article, then it is clear that
such restrictions on access to abortions are unconstitutional.
The challenged informed consent requirements can be divided
into two categories: "general" and "detailed." The first type are
general provisions which require the woman seeking an abortion to
certify in writing that she voluntarily consents to the abortion and
has been advised of the nature of the procedure used, the possible
risks of that procedure, and the risks of abortion in general. 2 The
second type require that the woman be informed of much more
detailed information, such as the physiological characteristics of
the fetus,1s the fetus' sensitivity to pain, 14 agencies which will as-
sist her in carrying the fetus to term,316 and the like. Some of these
more detailed informed consent requirements also provide that the
woman be told that the fetus is a human life,31 that she waives all
parental rights in the event of a live birth,31 7 and that she cannot
be denied welfare benefits merely for refusing to undergo an
abortion.318
The general informed consent provisions have been consist-
ently upheld because they do little more than codify existing tort
law principles concerning what a physician should disclose to a pa-
tient.319 By contrast, the detailed informed consent requirements
hour waiting period); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 112 § 12(5) (1974) (24 hour waiting period); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 188.039 (1974) (48 hour waiting period); NEBEL REV. STAT. § 28-327 (1977) (48
hour waiting period); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1 (1979) (48 hour waiting period); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-2 (1981) (24 hour waiting period); S.D. COMPILED LAWs ANN. § 34-23A-
108.1 (1980) (24 hour waiting period); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-302 (1979) (2 day waiting
period); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305.5 (1981) (24 hour waiting period).
312. See Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006 (lst
Cir. 1981); Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1976); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488
F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980); Women's Community Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F.
Supp. 542 (D. Me. 1979); Women's Services, P.C. v. Thone, 483 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Neb.
1979); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. IlM. 1978); Doe v. Deschamps, 461 F. Supp.
682 (D. Mont. 1976).
313. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006 (1st Cir. 1981);
Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181
(E.D. La. 1980); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. IM. 1978).
314. See, e.g., Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980).
315. See, e.g., Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980).
316. See, e.g., id.
317. See, e.g., Freiman v. Ashcroft, 584 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1978).
318. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1008 (1st Cir.
1981).
319. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Planned Parenthood
League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006 (1st Cir. 1981); Wolfe v. Schroering, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir.
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clearly intrude on a woman's right to make the decision whether to
have an abortion. First, such requirements are undoubtedly moti-
vated by the state's desire to discourage abortion. This purpose is
impermissible because, as explained earlier, 20 the state must take
a neutral position on the abortion issue. Laws with the purpose
and effect of discouraging abortion are unconstitutional. Second,
detailed informed consent statutes impinge on the requirement
that first trimester abortions are a matter to be left entirely to the
woman and her physician.2 As Justice Blackmun explained in
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth:22
[W]e are content to accept, as the meaning [of informed consent] the giving
of information to the patient as to just what would be done and as to its
consequences. To ascribe more meaning than this might well confine the at-
tending physician in an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket in the prac-
tice of his profession. 23
A physician is put in a "straitjacket" when required to inform a
woman of irrelevant, medically inadvisable or medically unproven
information, or when required to provide moral as opposed to
health-related messages. Finally, the state's interest in assuring
that consent is truly informed is adequately served by the general
doctrine of informed consent, as is the case with all other medical
procedures. The state could compel a woman to know of the physi-
ological and anatomical characteristics of the fetus for only one
purpose: to discourage abortions.
If abortion is to be considered a private moral judgment, then
the state cannot require that information relating to the morality
of the decision be given to every woman who seeks an abortion.
The state could only require that information which a reasonable
person would find to have a significant or material effect on the
medical aspects of the abortion decision be given. In fact, lower
courts reviewing the constitutionality of informed consent require-
ments "have upheld the requirements which coincide with the gen-
1976); Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1976); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F.
Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1981); Women's Services, P.C. v. Thone, 483 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Neb.
1979); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Il. 1978); Doe v. Deschamps, 461 F. Supp.
682 (D. Mont. 1976); Planned Parenthood Ass'n. v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa.
1975).
320. See supra text accompanying notes 267-77.
321. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163.
322. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
323. Id. at 67 n.8.
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eral law of informed consent and have invalidated the portions
which do not contribute to the goal of autonomous self-determina-
tion."'3 2' Lower courts have consistently struck down detailed in-
formed consent requirements as infringing on the woman's right to
make a private moral decision.25 The approach advocated in this
Article is entirely consistent with these precedents.
The requirements for a twenty-four or forty-eight hour waiting
period before a woman can undergo an abortion also unconstitu-
tionally infringe on a woman's right to make an autonomous deci-
sion. Why would a state require such a waiting period for abortions
but not for any other medical procedures? The obvious goal of
such statutes is the hope that some women will change their minds
during the waiting period and a law with the purpose and effect of
restricting abortions is unconstitutional. A state imposed waiting
period intrudes on the woman's right to make the decision exclu-
sively with her physician. Again, this conclusion is supported by
precedents because virtually all lower courts considering the issue
have invalidated waiting period requirements. "
Viewing abortion as a private moral judgment compels the re-
jection of detailed informed consent laws and waiting period re-
quirements. Lower courts have already ruled in this direction;
hopefully, the Supreme Court will follow.
CONCLUSION
Roe v. Wade will soon celebrate its tenth birthday. Is there
324. Note, Abortion Regulation: The Circumscription of State Intervention by the
Doctrine of Informed Consent, 15 GA. L. REV. 681, 702 (1981).
325. Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006 (lat Cir.
1981) (physiological characteristics); Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980) (physio-
logical characteristics, sensitivity to pain, copy of test results); Freiman v. Ashcroft, 584 F.2d
247 (8th Cir. 1978) (waiver of parental rights); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181
(E.D. La. 1980) (physiological characteristics, "including, but not limited to.. .", human
life from conception, major surgical procedure, birth control, assistance agencies); Women's
Services, P.C. v. Thone, 483 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Neb. 1979) ("reasonably possible medical and
mental consequences resulting from an abortion, pregnancy and childbirth"); Wynn v. Scott,
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any value, other than academic hindsight, to rethinking the deci-
sion or re-evaluating the alternative approaches the Court might
have taken? The continuing fervent debate over abortion assures
the need for repeated decisions in both the courts and the political
arena. A comparative approach, emphasizing the need to rhetori-
cally justify the outcome, can guide both the courts and the legisla-
tures in their future deliberations.
First, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court will have numer-
ous opportunities to reconsider its holding in Roe v. Wade. Per-
haps in the context of the Human Life Bill or when science ad-
vances the time of viability, the Supreme Court will need to again
explain the constitutional status of abortion. For the reasons given
above, the Court should explain Roe v. Wade as, ultimately, a deci-
sion that abortion is a private moral choice. The trimester divi-
sions and the choice of viability as the time after which abortion
can be banned are not integral to Roe v. Wade. Future Supreme
Court decisions should be guided by the core thesis of Roe v.
Wade: that the right of privacy protects a woman's decision as to
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. Simply put, the ap-
proach advocated in this Article is still possible, even a decade af-
ter Roe v. Wade.
Second, the debate in the political arena should be a compara-
tive one. The public debate over abortion should advance past
each side merely restating their arguments. Advocates should be
required to justify the assumptions and implications of their posi-
tions. After such a dialogue, it is likely that the legislatures and the
public will realize that it cannot be decided when life begins; that
the issue is where in society the abortion decision should be made.
That is, it should become evident that there is no rational way to
choose a single point, be it conception or viability, after which
abortions should not be allowed. Rather, the issue becomes who
should decide whether a fetus is to be regarded as a human person.
Ultimately, the question to be debated is whether the decision is
one of public morals for society to make, or private morals to be
left to each individual woman. A debate over this question can be
useful in guiding decisions on many other issues where a choice
must be made as to whether a decision should be left to the indi-
vidual or the community.
Finally, it is hoped that the analysis in this Article begins to
suggest the importance of evaluating the rhetoric of Supreme
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Court decisions. The justifications given for a decision are crucial.
Since there is rarely a "right" answer to a constitutional problem,
at the very least we can ask whether the Court has adequately jus-
tified the approach it has taken. After all, does the Supreme Court
have any power other than its ability to persuade other branches of
government to go along with judicial decisions? And if all judicial
authority is premised on its rhetorical powers, should not analysis
begin, especially in considering a controversial case like Roe v.
Wade, by analyzing that rhetoric?
